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ABSTRACT
Title of dissertation: DISTRIBUTED ESTIMATION AND
STABILITY OF EVOLUTIONARY GAME DYNAMICS
WITH APPLICATIONS TO STUDY OF ANIMAL MOTION
Shinkyu Park, Doctor of Philosophy, 2015
Dissertation directed by: Professor Nuno C. Martins
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
In this dissertation, we consider three problems: in the first we investigate dis-
tributed state estimation of linear time-invariant (LTI) plants; in the second we study opti-
mal remote state estimation of Markov processes; while in the third we examine stability
of evolutionary game dynamics in large populations.
Problem 1: Consider that an autonomous LTI plant is given and that each member
of a network of LTI observers accesses a portion of the output of the plant. The dissemi-
nation of information within the network is dictated by a pre-specified directed graph in
which each vertex represents an observer. This work proposes a distributed estimation
scheme that is a natural generalization of consensus in which each observer computes
its own state estimate using only the portion of the output vector accessible to it and the
state estimates of other observers that are available to it, according to the graph. Unlike
straightforward high-order solutions in which each observer broadcasts its measurements
throughout the network, the average size of the state of each observer in the proposed
scheme does not exceed the order of the plant plus one. We determine necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for the existence of a parameter choice for which the proposed scheme
attains asymptotic omniscience of the state of the plant at all observers. The conditions
reduce to certain detectability requirements that imply that if omniscience is not possible
under the proposed scheme then it is not viable under any other scheme – including higher
order LTI, nonlinear, and time-varying ones – subject to the same graph. We apply the
proposed scheme to distributed tracking of a group of water buffaloes.
Problem 2: Consider a two-block remote estimation framework in which a sensing
unit accesses the full state of a Markov process and decides whether to transmit informa-
tion about the state to a remotely located estimator given that each transmission incurs a
communication cost. The estimator finds the best state estimate of the process using the
information received from the sensing unit. The main purpose of this work is to design
transmission policies and estimation rules that dictate decision making of the sensing unit
and estimator, respectively, and that are optimal for a cost functional which combines the
expectation of squared estimation error and communication costs. Our main results es-
tablish the existence of transmission policies and estimation rules that are jointly optimal,
and propose an iterative procedure to find ones. Our convergence analysis shows that the
sequence of sub-optimal solutions generated by the proposed procedure has a convergent
subsequence, and the limit of any convergent subsequence is a person-by-person optimal
solution.1 We apply the proposed scheme to remote estimation of location of a water
buffalo.
Problem 3: We investigate an energy conservation and dissipation (passivity) as-
1The definitions of joint optimality and person-by-person optimality are given in Definition 3.1.2 and
Definition 3.1.3, respectively.
pect of evolutionary dynamics in evolutionary game theory. We define a notion of pas-
sivity for evolutionary dynamics, and describe conditions under which dynamics exhibit
passivity. For dynamics that are defined on a finite-dimensional state space, we show
that the conditions can be characterized in connection with state-space realizations of the
dynamics. In addition, we establish stability of passive dynamics in terms of dissipation
of stored energy defined by passivity, and present stability results in population games.
We provide implications of stability for various passive dynamics both analytically and
by means of numerical simulations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
We consider the following three problems: (i) distributed state estimation of LTI
plants (Chapter 2), (ii) remote state estimation of Markov processes (Chapter 3), and (iii)
stability of evolutionary game dynamics (Chapter 4). The main objective and summary
of main contributions to each problem are described in this chapter.
Main results of each chapter can be applied to study of animal motion: The estima-
tion schemes that will be studied in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 can be applied to tracking
of animal groups. The data from tracking animal groups are then analyzed to identify
and study collective animal motion. Based on results on stability of evolutionary game
dynamics, which are presented in Chapter 4, we can find a reasoning over which certain
collective motion emerges in animal groups.
1.1 Design of Distributed LTI Observers for State Omniscience
Consider the following linear time-invariant (LTI) plant in state-space form1:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k)
y(k) = Cx(k)
(1.1)
1In order to simplify the notation, without loss of generality, we omit noise terms in the state-space












Figure 1.1: A framework for distributed state estimation.
where x(k) ∈ Rn and y(k) =
(
yT1 (k) · · · yTm(k)
)T
, with yi(k) = Cix(k) ∈ Rri ,
represent the state and output, respectively.
We consider the problem of designing a group of m observers so that each observer
can asymptotically resolve the entire state x. Information exchange among observers is
constrained by a pre-selected directed graph G = (V,E) with V = {1, · · · ,m}, where
each vertex in V represents an observer and the edges in E ⊆ V×V determine the viability
and direction of information transfer. We refer to a given G as the communication graph
and we denote a group of m observers equipped with G, with each observer accessing an
element of {y1, . . . , ym}, as a distributed observer (see Figure 1.1 for an illustration).
The internal state of an observer consists of a state estimate x̂i and an additional
state zi that is updated based on its portion yi of the output of the plant and the state
estimates of the other observers connected to it via the edges of G. We later refer to zi as
the augmented state of observer i. A distributed observer is said to achieve omniscience
asymptotically if limk→∞ ||x̂i(k) − x(k)|| = 0 holds for all i in V, i.e., the state estimate
at every observer converges to the state of the plant.
2
Our main goals are: (i) Given a plant (1.1) and a graph G, we wish to determine neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a LTI distributed observer that achieves
omniscience asymptotically. (ii) Provided it exists, we want to find an omniscience-




µi < m (1.2)
The main technical challenges are: (i) Each observer accesses only a portion of the
output of the plant. Hence, unless the pair (A,Ci) is detectable for all i in V, state omni-
science requires information exchange among observers. The exception being the trivial
case in which the state of the plant can be resolved from the portion of the output available
to every observer. (ii) Notice that (1.2) rules out simple LTI schemes in which observers
share their measurements throughout the network.2 (iii) The existence of an omniscience-
achieving scheme that conforms with both G and (1.2) cannot be established by existing
results on observer design.
1.1.1 Summary of the Main Contributions
In order to achieve the stated goals, this work focuses on the following two contri-
butions: (i) We propose a parametrized class of LTI distributed observers within which
information exchange conforms to a pre-specified directed communication graph G. (ii)
We find necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a parameter choice for the
aforementioned class that is omniscience-achieving and satisfies the scalability constraint
(1.2). We also outline a method to compute such a parameter choice, provided it exists.
2See Section 2.2.1.3 for more details.
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In Section 2.4 we provide a detailed analysis that hinges on the fact that asymptotic
omniscience for the proposed class of distributed observers can be cast as the stabiliza-
tion of certain LTI systems via fully decentralized output feedback. Using this analogy, in
Theorem 2.2.2 we show that an omniscience-achieving parameter choice satisfying (1.2)
exists if and only if the state of the plant (1.1) is detectable from the combined output
portions available to each source component3 of G. We also ascertain that if such a de-
tectability condition holds then there exists an omniscience-achieving solution for which
the resulting aggregate dimension of all additional internal (augmented) states satisfies:
m∑
i=1
µi ≤ m−ms (1.3)
where ms is the number of source components4 of G. It follows from our analysis that if
there is no omniscience-achieving solution in the proposed class satisfying (1.2), then om-
niscience cannot be attained by any other scheme – including higher order LTI, nonlinear,
and time-varying ones – subject to the same graph.
We apply the distributed estimation scheme to tracking of 4 water buffaloes using
animal-borne wireless camera network. In Section 2.5, we present experimental results
using a data set collected from the deployment of animal-borne wireless camera network
in the Gorongosa National Park (Mozambique)
1.2 Optimal Remote State Estimation of Markov Processes
We study a two-block remote state estimation problem: Suppose that a sensing
unit accesses the full state xk of the process at time k, and decides whether to transmit
3The definition of the source component is given in Definition 2.2.1.















Figure 1.2: A framework for remote state estimation with a Markov process (P), a sensing
unit (S), and an estimator (E).
(Rk = 1) the accessed information xk to a remotely located estimator or not to transmit
(Rk = 0), where each transmission incurs a positive communication cost ck. The esti-
mator computes a state estimate x̂k that is a causal function of information available to it.
The diagram in Figure 1.2 depicts the framework adopted in this work.
Suppose that a transmission policy and an estimation rule at time k, denoted by T k
and Ek, respectively, dictate the random variable Rk and estimate x̂k as follows:




















d2 (xk, x̂k) + ck ·Rk





subject to a Markov process {xk}Nk=0 defined on a metric space (X, d). The total cost (1.5)
consists of the expectation of squared estimation error d2 (xk, x̂k) and communication
costs ck ·Rk.
Our goal is to find optimal transmission policies {T k}Nk=1 and estimation rules
5
{Ek}Nk=1 for (1.5). To achieve this, we formulate this as a two-player team decision prob-
lem, and find optimal decision functions for both players – sensing unit and estimator.
To assess optimality of solutions obtained in this work, we adopt the notions of joint
optimality and person-by-person optimality: A jointly optimal solution consists of the
transmission policies {T k}Nk=1 and estimation rules {Ek}
N
k=1 that achieve the minimum
of (1.5); while a person-by-person optimal solution consists of the transmission policies
{T k}Nk=1 and estimation rules {Ek}
N





(1.5), and vice versa.
1.2.1 Summary of the Main Contributions
Our main strategy, which is described in Section 3.1, is to divide the aforementioned
problem into a set of N sub-problems, and sequentially solve each sub-problem. In Sec-
tion 3.2, adapting the notions of joint optimality and person-by-person optimality to each
sub-problem, we focus on the following contributions for each sub-problem: (i) We show
that there exists a jointly optimal solution. As jointly optimal solutions are also person-
by-person optimal, this result ensures that the set of person-by-person optimal solutions
is non-empty. (ii) We propose an iterative procedure to compute a person-by-person op-
timal solution. The procedure, which is inspired from Lloyd’s algorithm originally used
to compute Centroidal Voronoi Tessellations [1–3], alternates between finding a best re-
sponse (transmission policy) of the sensing unit to a decision function (estimation rule)
of the estimator and vice versa, and it generates a sequence of sub-optimal solutions. Our
analysis will show that the sequence has a convergent subsequence, and the limit of any
6
convergent subsequence is a person-by-person optimal solution. In Section 3.3, we de-
scribe how to recover an optimal solution to the original problem from optimal solutions
of the sub-problems. In Section 3.4, we consider two specific Markov process models –
linear system models and self-propelled particle models, and verify that our main results
are applicable to these models. Lastly, we apply the remote estimation scheme to track-
ing of a water buffalo using animal-borne wireless camera network. In Section 3.5, we
present experimental results using a data set collected from the deployment of animal-
borne wireless camera network in the Gorongosa National Park (Mozambique).
1.3 Evolutionary Game Dynamics and Passivity
Of central interest, in evolutionary game theory [4, 5], is the study of dynamics of
strategically interacting players in large populations. This line of study involves an inves-
tigation of properties of behavioral rules adopted by players and asymptotes of trajectories
induced by the rules in an effort to identify stable equilibria. In this work, we conduct
the investigation by adapting the notion of passivity originated from dynamical system
theory [6, 7].
Consider multiple populations of players engaged in a game in which each player
chooses a strategy from a finite set of strategies, and repeatedly revises its strategy choice
in response to given payoffs. Evolutionary dynamics describe such strategy revision pro-
cesses and determine the time-evolution of the population state – the distribution of strat-
egy choices across populations. Assuming that there are infinitely many players in each
population, we express evolutionary dynamics with differential equations and regard these
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dynamics as dynamical systems. This point of view allows us to define passivity for evo-
lutionary dynamics and to perform stability analysis based on passivity methods adopted
from dynamical system theory literature.
The study of evolutionary dynamics and associated stability concepts has been one
of active research areas in evolutionary game theory. Brown and von Neumann [8] studied
Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamics to examine the existence of optimal strate-
gies for a zero-sum two-player game. Taylor and Jonker [9] studied replicator dynamics
and established a connection between evolutionarily stable strategies and stable equilib-
ria of replicator dynamics. Later the result was strengthened by Zeeman [10] who also
proposed a stability concept for games under replicator dynamics. Also Gilboa and Mat-
shu [11] considered cyclic stability for games under dynamics exhibiting the best response
choice.
In succeeding work, rather than working on specific forms of dynamics such as ones
considered in [8–11], stability results were established for various classes of evolutionary
dynamics. Swinkels [12] considered a class of myopic adjustment dynamics, and studied
strategic stability of equilibria of these dynamics. Ritzberger and Weibull [13] considered
a class of sign-preserving selection dynamics, and studied asymptotic stability of faces of
the population state space. In particular, the authors discovered that a face spanned by
a set of pure strategies is stable under sign-preserving selection dynamics if the face is
closed under a better-reply correspondence.
In a recent development of evolutionary game theory, Hofbauer and Sandholm [14]
studied stable games and established global stability results for a certain class of evolu-
tionary dynamics, which includes excess payoff/target (EPT) dynamics, pairwise compar-
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ison dynamics, and perturbed best response (PBR) dynamics. Fox and Shamma [15] later
revealed that stable games and the aforementioned class of evolutionary dynamics exhibit
passivity. Based on an input-output property of passive dynamical systems, the authors
established L2-stability of evolutionary dynamics in a class of (generalized) stable games.
In addition, applications of evolutionary game theory to study of animal group motion are
found in [16, 17], where stable strategy choices in animal pursuit-evasion problems are
examined.
Inspired on the passivity analysis in [15], we further investigate passivity in evolu-
tionary game theory. Our main goals are (i) to define passivity for evolutionary dynamics
that admit realizations in a finite-dimensional state space and present systematic methods
to examine passivity of evolutionary dynamics of interest; and (ii) to establish stability of
passive dynamics in population games.
1.3.1 Summary of the Main Contributions
1. We define three notions of passivity – (ordinary) passivity, strict passivity, and strict
output passivity – and explain how passivity defines stored energy of evolutionary
dynamics, which will be used to establish stability of the dynamics. We characterize
passivity in terms of vector fields that define state-space realizations of evolutionary
dynamics. Based on this characterization, we show that the EPT dynamics, pair-
wise comparison dynamics, and PBR dynamics are passive; while the replicator
dynamics are not.
2. We investigate properties of passive evolutionary dynamics in relation to the Nash
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stationarity (NS) condition and positive correlation (PC) condition5. We first show
that for passive dynamics satisfying (NS), their equilibrium points coincide with
the set of states that achieve the lowest level of stored energy of the dynamics. In
addition, if the dynamics also satisfy (PC) then we show that these dynamics cannot
be strictly output passive.
3. We show an equivalence between passivity of evolutionary dynamics and (a weak
form of) stability of a closed-loop resulting from a feedback interconnection of
evolutionary dynamics and a certain class of payoff operators. This result leads
us to re-define passivity of evolutionary dynamics using a class of (generalized)
population games. Furthermore, we study the effect of control costs on passivity
where we establish a relation between convexity of control costs and passivity of
evolutionary dynamics.
4. Based on the above contributions, we present stability results for passive evolution-
ary dynamics in population games. In particular, we consider a class of games that
generalizes stable games [14], and show that in this class of games, stored energy of
passive dynamics converges to its lowest level. We provide an interpretation of the
convergence of stored energy for formerly established dynamics both analytically
and by means of numerical simulations.
5See (NS) and (PC) in Section 4.2.3 for their respective definitions.
10
1.3.2 Stability Concept and Landscape Metaphor
A landscape metaphor from genetics suggests that each individual in populations
would move up toward the peak of fitness landscape, and would reside unless external
force is applied [18, 19]. This metaphor suggests a reasoning over which the state of
populations evolves and a “stable equilibrium” emerges.
In this work, we adopt a concept of stability that is similar to the idea suggested by
the landscape metaphor: Stability implies that along the trajectory of the population state,
stored energy of evolutionary dynamics converges to its lowest level. The convergence to
the lowest energy level would have distinct interpretations which are specific to individual
evolutionary dynamics. In some cases, the convergence implies that the population state
approaches equilibrium points of dynamics; and hence it establishes asymptotic stability
of the equilibrium points. As a case in point, in Section 4.3, we will show that for the
BNN dynamics and Smith dynamics, the convergence implies that the population state
converges to Nash equilibria; and for the logit dynamics, it implies that the population
state converges to the set of best-response strategy distributions.
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Chapter 2: Design of Distributed LTI Observers for State Omniscience
2.1 Problem Formulation
2.1.1 Notation
• m is the number of observers that form the distributed observer.
• G = (V,E) is a graph1 formed by a vertex set V and an edge set E ⊆ V× V.
• Ip is the p-dimensional identity matrix.
• 1p is the p-dimensional vector with all entries equal to one.
• ⊗ represents Kronecker product of matrices.
• For a set {K1, · · · , Kp} of matrices, we define the following block diagonal matrix:
diag (K1, · · · , Kp) def=


K1 · · · 0
... . . .
...
0 · · · Kp


• Given a set V = {1, · · · , |V|}, W = (wij)i,j∈V is a matrix in R|V|×|V| whose i, j-th
entry is wij .
1For notational convenience, we assume that every vertex of G has a self-loop, i.e., (i, i) ∈ E for all i in
V.
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• For a set J = {j1, · · · , jp} ⊆ {1, · · · ,m} and matrices B and C formed by con-
catenating conformal submatrices {Bi}mi=1 and {Ci}mi=1 as B =
(




CT1 · · · CTm
)T











CTj1 · · · CTjp
)T
2.1.2 Problem Description
We consider that a LTI plant (1.1) and a directed communication graph G are given.
Without loss of generality, we consider that the dynamic matrix A is nondegenerate (see
Appendix A.2) and that the output matrices {Ci}mi=1 are nonzero. Each vertex i in V is
associated with an observer that accesses yi(k) = Cix(k). We adopt the convention that
E includes edge (j, i) if information can be transmitted from observer j to observer i.
The neighborhood of observer i, denoted as Ni, is a subset of V that contains i and all
other vertices with an outgoing edge towards i. Essentially, elements of Ni represent the
observers that can transmit information to observer i.
In this work, we adopt the following parametrized class of distributed observers
inspired on [20], where for each i in V, observer i updates its internal state according to
the following state-space equation:
x̂i(k + 1) = A
∑
j∈Ni
wij x̂j(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
state estimate




zi(k + 1) = Qi (yi(k)− Cix̂i(k)) + Sizi(k)
(2.1)
where wij ∈ R, Ki ∈ Rn×ri , Pi ∈ Rn×µi , Qi ∈ Rµi×ri , Si ∈ Rµi×µi are the design pa-
rameters and µi is the dimension of the augmented state zi.2 We refer to {Ki,Pi,Qi,Si}i∈V
2We use bold font to represent the parameters to be designed. The role of the augmented states in (2.1)
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as gain matrices and W = (wij)i,j∈V as a weight matrix
3 that must satisfy
∑
j∈Ni wij = 1
for all i in V. The update scheme (2.1) complies with G because the estimate x̂i of ob-
server i only depends on yi and the estimates {x̂j}j∈Ni of the observers in its neighborhood
Ni.
The following Definition of an omniscience-achieving parameter choice will be
used throughout the chapter.
Definition 2.1.1 (Omniscience-achieving Parameter Choice). Consider a LTI plant
(1.1) with state x and a distributed observer whose state estimates {x̂i}i∈V are computed
according to (2.1). A parameter choice W = (wij)i,j∈V and {Ki,Pi,Qi,Si}i∈V for
(2.1) is referred to as omniscience-achieving if the resulting distributed observer achieves
omniscience asymptotically, i.e., limk→∞ ||x̂i(k)− x(k)|| = 0 holds for all i in V.
The following is the main problem addressed in this work.
Problem 2.1.2. Given a LTI plant (1.1) and a graph G, determine necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of an omniscience-achieving parameter choice for (2.1) that
satisfies the scalability condition (1.2).
2.1.3 Comparative Survey of Related Work
The work in [21, 22] introduced a computationally tractable distributed state esti-
mation scheme for linear plants. The proposed method, so called Distributed Kalman
is explained in Section 2.2.1.2.
3We assume that wij = 0 if j /∈ Ni for all i in V.
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Filtering (DKF)4, alternates between an estimation (Kalman filtering) step and a data-
fusion step that can be viewed as consensus [24].
Results on the performance and stability of the DKF are presented in [25–28]. In
particular, the authors of [25] showed non-convexity of performance optimization for a
simple system model, e.g., a first-order LTI plant. In [27, 28], stability properties of the
DKF are studied when multiple data-fusion steps are allowed between two consecutive
estimation steps.
Subsequent work [29–36] investigates similar estimation schemes which have the
structure of an estimation-data fusion alternation as in [21, 22]. In [31], the authors per-
formed a stability analysis in terms of the plant model and underlying communication
graph to obtain gain parameters for the estimation step; and in [35], these parameters are
obtained via optimization of a quadratic estimation cost. Besides, the data-fusion step is
realized using weighted averaging [29], diffusion strategies [30], gossip algorithms [32],
and internal model average consensus [33].
Other notable approaches to distributed estimation are proposed in [37–41]. The
authors of [37] introduced a design method for the DKF which is based on spatial de-
composition of the plant and a distributed algorithm for matrix computation. In [38], a
distributed estimation algorithm is proposed for plants that consist of overlapping subsys-
tems. In addition, a moving horizon estimation scheme was used in [39], and a H2/H∞
optimization framework was adopted in [40, 41] for distributed state estimation.
Moreover, in [42, 43], the authors establish necessary conditions for achieving om-
niscience in distributed state estimation. These conditions specify observability/detectability
4An extensive review of the DKF schemes is found in [23].
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requirements in terms of the plant model and underlying communication graph.
To achieve asymptotic omniscience, some of the existing schemes require (i) strong
observability conditions [26,30,38], (ii) multiple data-fusion steps between two consecu-
tive estimation steps [27,28], which imposes a two-time-scale structure, or (iii) imposition
of algebraic constraints on the underlying graph [31,33,36], which are stronger than what
is considered in our work.
In contrast to previous work, we propose a class of distributed observers that operate
on a single time-scale, and we find necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of an omniscience-achieving distributed observer in this class for which the scalability
condition (1.2) holds. It will follow from our analysis that if asymptotic omniscience
cannot be achieved under the proposed scheme then it is not possible under any other
scheme – including higher order LTI, nonlinear, and time-varying ones – subject to the
same communication graph.
The use of augmented states as in (2.1) was proposed in [20], where we also
provided sufficient conditions for the existence of an omniscience-achieving parameter
choice. In [44], we developed necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
an omniscience-achieving parameter choice for the case where W is a pre-selected sym-
metric matrix. This work extends and unifies our prior results in the following way: we
consider directed communication graphs, which allow asymmetric W, and we investi-
gate necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an omniscience-achieving
parameter choice for (2.1). Unlike the methods proposed in [20] and [44], here we also
consider the scalability constraint (1.2).
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2.2 Main Result
In this section, we present our solution to Problem 2.1.2, and an example that illus-
trates it. We start by defining the source component of a graph.




of G is said to be a source component5 if there is no edge from V \ VC to
VC . Also we define a set of source component representatives6 as a subset VR of V that
contains exactly one element (representative) from each source component of G.
The following is our main Theorem.
Theorem 2.2.2. Suppose that the plant is given as in (1.1), that the communication graph
G = (V,E) is pre-selected, and that the following hold:
(i) There are ms source components7 of G which are represented as {(Vl,El)}msl=1.
Each source component Gl = (Vl,El) is associated with a subsystem of the plant
described by the pair (A,CVl).
(ii) Let VR be a set of source component representatives. For each i in VR, we define
νi to be the order (number of vertices) of the source component to which vertex i
belongs.
5We adopt the convention that if the graph G is strongly connected then G itself is a (unique) source
component.
6The choice of VR may not be unique.








G1 = (V1,E1) G2 = (V2,E2)
Figure 2.1: A communication graph G for Example 2.2.3.
There is an omniscience-achieving parameter choice for (2.1) that satisfies (1.2) if and
only if all the subsystems {(A,CVl)}msl=1 are detectable. In particular, if such a detectabil-





νi − 1 if i ∈ VR
0 otherwise
(2.2)
for all i in V.
The proof is given in Section 2.4. When the conditions of the Theorem are verified,
the method outlined in Appendix A.1.2 can be used to compute omniscience-achieving
parameters for which (2.2) is satisfied. Notice that because
∑
i∈VR νi ≤ m holds, we can
conclude that µi given by (2.2) satisfies (1.2). In fact, since VR has ms elements, it also
follows that (1.3) holds.
Example 2.2.3. Consider the communication graph G = (V,E) depicted in Figure 2.1
and a LTI plant (1.1) with m = 7. From Definition 2.2.1, we conclude that G1 and G2
are the source components of G, and we select VR = {1, 6}. From Theorem 2.2.2, we







2 if i = 1
1 if i = 6
0 otherwise
if and only if (A,CV1) and (A,CV2) are both detectable. 
2.2.1 Additional Remarks on the Proposed Class of Distributed Observers
2.2.1.1 The Effect of Noise on the Estimation Performance
Although our formulation focuses on the noiseless case, the fact that the plant and
the distributed observer are LTI guarantees graceful degradation with respect to noise in
the communication links and/or measurements. In particular, if the noise amplitude is
bounded by β then the limit maxi∈V limk→∞ ‖x̂i(k)−x(k)‖ may be positive, but one can
find an upper bound that scales linearly with β. Also, the effect of noise can be quantified
using classical frequency-domain methods.
2.2.1.2 The Role of the Augmented States
As will be discussed in Section 2.4.3, asymptotic omniscience for the proposed
class of distributed observers can be cast as the stabilization of certain LTI systems via
fully decentralized output feedback. The augmented states in (2.1) are directly related
with the internal dynamics of such a decentralized controller which gives us additional
freedom in designing the way local state estimates and measurements are fused.
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2.2.1.3 Complexity of the Proposed Scheme
We evaluate the complexity of the proposed scheme in terms of the dimensions of
the augmented states required to achieve asymptotic omniscience.
For the sake of argument, we compare our method with a simple relay-based cen-
tralized scheme described as follows: Suppose that under the same configuration as in
Figure 1.1, every observer would transmit its local measurement to its neighbors and,
at the same time, would relay local measurements received from neighboring observers
in which each transmission/relay incurs a unit time delay. Under this setting, the fixed-
lag smoothing scheme [45] can be adopted at each observer to determine its update rule
for state estimation. Similar to our scheme, the internal state of each observer in the
centralized scheme consists of a state estimate and an augmented state to account for the
time delay in transmission/relay. However, in what regards to achieving asymptotic omni-
science, this centralized scheme would require augmented states whose dimensions would
be much larger than our scheme. To see this, we note that in the centralized scheme, the
dimension of the augmented state of each observer i is equal to the product of the order
of the plant and the maximum length among the respective shortest paths from the other
vertices to vertex i in the graph G. In contrast, as stated in Theorem 2.2.2, in our scheme
only one observer per source component needs an augmented state, whose dimension
equals the order of the source component minus one. As a case in point, suppose that G is
a directed ring, and let n andm be the orders of the plant and graph G, respectively. Then,
for the centralized scheme, the aggregate dimension of all augmented states could be as
large as n ·m · (m− 1); whereas, for the scheme we propose it is no larger than m− 1.
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2.3 Application to the Synchronization of Coupled Multi-agent Systems
Given a graph G = (V,E) with V = {1, · · · ,m} and a set VI = {1, · · · ,ma},
consider a LTI multi-agent system whose state-space representation is given as follows:





















, i ∈ V (2.3b)
For each i in VI , χ(i)(k) takes a value in Rn and represents the state of agent i. For each
i in V, yi(k) and ui(k) take values in Rri and Rpi , and represent the output and control
input of the system (2.3) associated with vertex i of G, respectively.
For each i, j in VI , the matrix Fij in (2.3a) quantifies the coupling between the state




represents the coupling among the states of agents in which, for each i in VI and j in
VI \ {i}, an edge (j, i) belongs EI if and only if Fij 6= 0 holds. We refer to GI as the
interaction graph of the multi-agent system (2.3). We remark that if all the agents are
synchronized at time k0 8, i.e., χ(1)(k0) = · · · = χ(ma)(k0), then they remain synchronized
and the state of each agent i satisfies
χ(i)(k + 1) = Foχ
(i)(k)
8In this case, we may assume that ui(k) = 0, ∀i ∈ V and k ≥ k0, since there is no need to control
synchronized agents.
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for k ≥ k0. The agent model (2.3) is called homogeneous because the agents have the
same internal dynamics as specified by the dynamic matrix Fo.
The goal is to design a set of controllers for which the agents of the system (2.3)
are asymptotically synchronized, i.e., limk→∞
∥∥χ(i)(k)− χ(1)(k)
∥∥ = 0 holds for all i in
VI \ {1}. In particular, we suppose that each controller i is represented by vertex i in V
and has the following state-space representation:













where ξi is the internal state of controller i, and Ni is the neighborhood of controller i
defined by G, which represents the controllers that can transmit information to controller i.
We refer to a set of controllers equipped with G as a distributed controller. The diagram


























Figure 2.2: A diagram showing an example of an overall closed-loop system that consists
of a LTI multi-agent system and distributed controller. See Example 2.3.3 for a numerical
implementation of the closed-loop system.
23
We summarize the problem as follows.












i,j∈V for (2.4) such that the interconnec-






for all i in VI \ {1}, and
(ii) show that the state of each agent converges to a solution of χo(k + 1) = Foχo(k)





for all i in VI .
The literature on the problem of designing distributed controllers for synchroniza-
tion of multi-agent systems is vast (see, for instance, [46–49] and references therein). To
mention a few, the work of [50] considered synchronization of linearly coupled nonlinear
agents, and the authors of [51] formulate synchronization as mixed-integer nonlinear op-
timization. Also, there is recent work [52–59] that focused on studying synchronization
problems with LTI multi-agent models. The framework in these articles assumes that the
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states of agents are completely decoupled, and each agent has an associated controller
that accesses its full state and has full control of it.
Here, we consider a LTI multi-agent system in which (i) agents are interacting ac-
cording to (2.3a), (ii) for each j in V, the j-th control input uj(k) affects the state of
the system according to {Gij}i∈VI , and (iii) for each i in V, the i-th output vector yi(k)
depends on the state of the system according to Hi. Due to (i)-(iii), the formulation con-
sidered in Problem 2.3.1 may not be cast as one to which existing results for completely
decoupled multi-agent models can be applied. More specifically, suppose that each agent
has an associated controller that accesses its full state and has full control of it. To trans-
form the agent model (2.3a) into a completely decoupled one, each controller needs to
access the states of the agents on which the state of its associated agent depends, and
generate control to cancel the coupling. However, this may not be possible since the
interaction graph GI and graph G, whose edges determine the viability and direction of
information transfer among controllers, may not be identical as depicted in Figure 2.2.
The proposed scheme can be applied to frequency synchronization in power grids
[60–62], which ensures stable operation of grids and efficient power transfer from gener-
ators to loads.
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Our solution to Problem 2.3.1 is given as follows.
Proposition 2.3.2. Suppose that a graph G = (V,E) is pre-selected, that a LTI multi-
agent system is given as in (2.3), and that G and the matrices in (2.5) satisfy the following:
(i) The pair (A′, B′) is stabilizable, where A′ and B′ are defined in (2.5b) and (2.5c),
respectively.
(ii) The graph G and the pair (A,C) satisfy the detectability condition of Theorem 2.2.2,
where A and C are defined in (2.5a) and (2.5d), respectively.






for all i in VI \ {1}. Furthermore, if all eigenvalues of Fo lie on or inside the unit circle
in C, then the state of each agent converges to a solution of
χo(k + 1) = Foχo(k)

















A′1,1 · · · A′1,ma−1
... . . .
...







Fij − F1j if i 6= j
Fo −
∑













CT1 · · · CTm
)T












A constructive proof of Proposition 2.3.2 is given in Appendix A.3, where we use










i,j∈V for (2.4) for which the
interconnection of (2.3) and (2.4) results in the asymptotic synchronization of the system
(2.3).
Example 2.3.3 (Numerical Example). Consider a multi-agent system (2.3) and the graph




















1 0 0 0









−1 1 0 1









0 −1 1 0









0 0 −1 −1




(H11 H12 H13 H14) =
(
1 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
)
(H21 H22 H23 H24) =
(
0 0 1 0 −1 0 0 0
)
(H31 H32 H33 H34) =
(
1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
)
The assumptions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2.3.2 are satisfied; hence, the existence
of a distributed controller (2.4) that synchronizes the system (2.3) is guaranteed. We com-
pute a parameter choice for (2.4) according to the procedure described in Appendix A.3.1
and Appendix A.3.2. The state trajectories of the resulting closed-loop system are de-
picted in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: A simulation result of Example 2.3.3 which depicts the synchronization of






1 (k) of the states of agent 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Remark 2.3.4. Since our results can be applied to any interaction graph GI , the assump-
tion (ii) of Proposition 2.3.2 may be stronger than what would be needed for the cases in
which the agents are completely decoupled (cf. Assumption 1 in [58]). As a case in point,
consider a system configuration with the same number of agents and controllers and for
which the agents are all decoupled, i.e., VI = V and EI =
⋃
i∈VI (i, i). In addition,
assume that the input and output matrices of (2.3), respectively, satisfy Gij = 0 if i 6= j
for all i in VI and j in V, and Hi = eTi ⊗H ′i for all i in V and for a matrix H ′i in Rri×n,
where ei is the i-th column of the ma-dimensional identity matrix. Under this setting, (ii)
of Proposition 2.3.2 requires the graph G to be strongly connected, while Assumption 1
in [58] only requires G to have a directed spanning tree.
2.4 Proof of the Main Theorem
In this section, we provide a proof for Theorem 2.2.2. If the conditions of the
Theorem hold then Appendix A.1.2 outlines a randomized method to obtain a choice of
omniscience-achieving parameters.
The proof has two parts: It starts with Lemma 2.4.3, Lemma 2.4.4, and Theo-
rem 2.4.5 that describe important spectral properties of a parametrized class of weight
matrices W. The second part, which consists of Proposition 2.4.8, Theorem 2.4.10, and
Remark 2.4.11, determines conditions for a parameter choice W and {Ki,Pi,Qi,Si}i∈V














Figure 2.4: A precedence diagram for the proof of Theorem 2.2.2
2.4.1 Key Results on Weighted Laplacian Matrices
Definition 2.4.1. Consider a graph G = (V,E) with V = {1, · · · , |V|}. A matrix
L = (lij)i,j∈V is said to be a Weighted Laplacian Matrix (WLM) of G if the following three
conditions hold:
(i) If (j, i) /∈ E then lij = 0 for all i in V and j in V \ {i}.
(ii) If (j, i) ∈ E then lij < 0 for all i in V and j in V \ {i}.
(iii) It holds that
∑|V|
j=1 lij = 0 for all i in V.




∣∣∣ L is a WLM of G
}
Definition 2.4.2 (UEPP). Given square matrices A and B, A ⊗ B is said to have the
so called Unique Eigenvalue Product Property (UEPP) if every nonzero eigenvalue λ of
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A ⊗ B can be uniquely expressed9 as a product λ = λA · λB, where λA and λB are
eigenvalues of A and B, respectively.
Lemma 2.4.3. Let G = (V,E) with V = {1, · · · , |V|} be a directed graph, and A be a
matrix in Rn×n. Suppose that a matrix W in R|V|×|V| is defined as W = I|V|−αL, where
α is a positive real number and L = (lij)i,j∈V is a WLM of G. Given L and α′ satisfying
0 < α′ ≤
(
max1≤i≤|V| lii
)−1 10, for almost every α in (0, α′), W is a stochastic matrix
and W ⊗ A satisfies the UEPP.
Lemma 2.4.4. Let a matrix W in Rm×m and a matrix A in Rn×n be given. If all eigen-
values of W are simple11 and W ⊗ A satisfies the UEPP, then each eigenvector q of
W ⊗ A associated with a nonzero eigenvalue λ can be written as a Kronecker product
q = v⊗ p, where v and p are, respectively, eigenvectors of W and A (associated with the
eigenvalues λW and λA for which λ = λW · λA holds).
The proofs of Lemmas 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 are given in Appendix A.4.
Theorem 2.4.5. Let G = (V,E) be a strongly connected graph. For almost every element
L of the set L(G), the following hold:
(i) Every right and left eigenvectors of L have no zero entries.
(ii) Every eigenvalue of L is simple.
9For an eigenvalue λ of A⊗B, let λA, λ′A be the eigenvalues of A and λB , λ′B be the eigenvalues of B
for which λ = λA · λB = λ′A · λ′B holds. The eigenvalue λ is said to be uniquely expressed as a product
λ = λA · λB if it holds that λA = λ′A and λB = λ′B .





11An eigenvalue of a matrix is simple if both the geometric and algebraic multiplicities of the eigenvalue
are equal to 1.
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Since Theorem 2.4.5 hinges on structured linear system theory, in Appendix A.5
we provide a review of key concepts followed by a proof.
2.4.2 A Brief Introduction to Stabilization via Decentralized Control
We review certain classical results in decentralized control that will be used in the
proof of Theorem 2.2.2. Of special relevance are the fundamental work of [63–66] that
investigates the notion of fixed modes12 for LTI plants, and the work of [68] that studies
the effect of decentralized output feedback on LTI plants. To introduce these results, we
consider the following state-space representation for a LTI plant:






for each i in V = {1, · · · , |V|}, where x̃(k) ∈ Rñ, ũi(k) ∈ Rp̃i , and ỹi(k) ∈ Rr̃i are the
state, i-th control input, and i-th output, respectively.
Definition 2.4.6. [63, 64] A given λ ∈ C is a fixed mode of (2.6) if it is an eigenvalue of
Ã+
∑|V|
i=1 B̃iKiC̃i for all Ki in Rp̃i×r̃i .
Remark 2.4.7. The fixed mode is an eigenvalue of the plant (2.6) which is invariant
under the decentralized output feedback ũi(k) = Kiỹi(k) for all i in V, where Ki is a
matrix in Rp̃i×r̃i . In addition, if the plant (2.6) has an unstable fixed mode then it cannot
be stabilized by any decentralized controller that is causal and LTI (see [63, 64] for the
details).
12The notion of fixed modes is analogous to the concept of uncontrollable or unobservable modes adopted
in centralized control problems [67].
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The fixed modes can be characterized by an algebraic rank test described in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 2.4.8. [65, 66] Consider that a LTI plant is given as in (2.6). Let
B̃ =
(




C̃T1 · · · C̃T|V|
)T





Ã− λ · Iñ B̃J
C̃Jc 0

 < ñ (2.7)





be a graph of a LTI plant (2.6) in which the edge set EP
satisfies (j, i) ∈ EP if and only if C̃i
(
z · Iñ − Ã
)−1
B̃j is nonzero. The plant (2.6) is said





In the following Theorem, based on Theorem 4 of [68], we specify the effect of
decentralized output feedback of the following form on a strongly connected LTI plant.
z1(k + 1) = S1z1(k) +Q1ỹ1(k)
ũ1(k) = P1z1(k) +K1ỹ1(k)
(2.8a)
ũi(k) = Kiỹi(k), i ∈ V \ {1} (2.8b)
where z1(k) takes a value in Rµ1 for a nonnegative integer µ1.
Theorem 2.4.10. Consider a LTI plant given as in (2.6) and decentralized output feed-
back (2.8). Suppose that the plant is strongly connected and has no unstable fixed mode.
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Then, for almost every choice of {Ki}i∈V\{1}, there exists a choice of K1, P1, Q1, S1























Remark 2.4.11. The system (2.9) also can be viewed as the closed-loop system obtained









We can find a parameter choice K1, P1, Q1, S1 for which (2.9) is stable using results on
finding stabilizing (centralized) controllers for LTI systems. In particular, by adopting
the result of [69], we can find a stabilizing controller (2.8a) of order µ1 equal to the
controllability index of (2.10) minus one.
2.4.3 Additional Preliminary Results
Let ms be the number of source components of G in which we denote each source
component as Gl = (Vl,El), and VR be the set of source component representatives (see






W1 · · · 0 0
... . . .
...
...
0 · · · Wms 0




For each l in {1, · · · ,ms}, the sparsity pattern of Wl ∈ R|Vl|×|Vl| must be consistent13
with Gl so that under a suitable choice of {Wms+1,l}ms+1l=1 , the sparsity pattern of W
given above is consistent with G.
For notational convenience, we consider that Vl = {1, · · · , |Vl|} and Vl ∩ VR = {1}.
To analyze the asymptotic omniscience of the proposed estimation scheme, under the pa-
rameter choice of W and {Ki,Pi,Qi,Si}i∈V described in Appendix A.1.2, we derive the
state-space representation for the dynamics for the estimation error of (2.1) associated























x̃T1 · · · x̃T|Vl|
)T
with x̃i = x− x̂i, and Wl is a submatrix of W associated
with Gl as in (2.11). For each i in Vl, Bi = ei ⊗ In and Ci = eTi ⊗ Ci where ei is the i-th
column of the |Vl|-dimensional identity matrix. Notice that (2.12) can be viewed as the
state-space representation of the closed-loop system obtained by applying decentralized
output feedback, parametrized by K1, P1, Q1, S1, {Ki}i∈Vl\{1}, to a LTI system described
13The sparsity pattern of a matrix W = (wij)i,j∈V is consistent with a graph G = (V,E) if wij = 0 for





Wl ⊗ A, −
(













Hence, we can write (2.12) as in (2.9) by selecting Ã = Wl ⊗ A, P1 = P1, Q1 = Q1,
S1 = S1 and B̃i = −Bi, C̃i = Ci, Ki = Ki for all i in Vl. This idea, in conjunction with
Theorem 2.4.10, allows us to connect the stability of the estimation error dynamics (2.12)
with strong connectivity of (2.13) and the absence of unstable fixed modes in (2.13).
The following Lemma states certain spectral properties of W determined by Pro-
cedure 3 in Appendix A.1.2.1. The proof of Theorem 2.2.2 is then followed.
Lemma 2.4.12. The submatrices {Wl}msl=1 and Wms+1,ms+1 of W in (2.11) satisfy the
following with probability one:
(P1) For each l in {1, · · · ,ms}, every right and left eigenvectors of Wl have no zero
entries.
(P2) For each l in {1, · · · ,ms}, every eigenvector q of Wl ⊗ A associated with an
unstable eigenvalue λ can be written as a Kronecker product q = v ⊗ p, where v
and p are, respectively, eigenvectors of Wl and A (associated with the eigenvalue
λWl and the unstable eigenvalue λA for which λ = λWl · λA holds).
(P3) Every eigenvalue of Wms+1,ms+1 ⊗ A is zero.
Proof. Notice that for each l in {1, · · · ,ms}, in Procedure 3 (Line 3-10), we have set
Wl = I|Vl|− αL where α is chosen according to a uniform distribution defined on (0, 1),
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and L = (lij)i,j∈Vl is a WLM of Gl, each of its nonzero off-diagonal entries lij is chosen
according to a uniform distribution defined on
(
− 1|Ni|−1 , 0
)
independent of choices of
other entries. By Theorem 2.4.5, L satisfies (i) of Theorem 2.4.5 which ensures that (P1)
holds with probability one.
In addition, according to Lemma 2.4.3 and Theorem 2.4.5, this choice of α and
L ensures that Wl is a stochastic matrix and has all simple eigenvalues, and Wl ⊗ A
satisfies the UEPP (see Definition 2.4.2) with probability one. Since Wl is stochastic,
its eigenvalues lie on or inside the unit circle in C; hence, an unstable eigenvalue λ of
Wl ⊗ A can be written as λ = λWl · λA where λWl is an eigenvalue of Wl and λA is an
unstable eigenvalue of A. Therefore, invoking Lemma 2.4.4, we conclude that (P2) holds
with probability one.
Lastly, the way entries of Wms+1,ms+1 are chosen by Procedure 3 (Line 11-14)
ensures that all eigenvalues of Wms+1,ms+1 are zero and (P3) holds.
2.4.4 Proof of Theorem 2.2.2
First of all notice that if the subsystem (A,CVl) of the plant (1.1) is not detectable,
then for any choice of Wl, the system (2.13) has an unstable fixed mode. By Re-
mark 2.4.7, there is no parameter choice for which the estimation error dynamics (2.12)
is stable; hence, no omniscience-achieving parameter choice exists for (2.1). This proves
the necessity of Theorem 2.2.2.
Let Vms+1 = V \
⋃ms
l=1 Vl. Consider that {Wms+1,l}
ms+1
l=1 and {Ki}i∈Vms+1 , {µi}i∈Vms+1
are determined by Procedure 3 (Line 11-14) and Procedure 4 (Line 9-11) in Appendix A.1.2,
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respectively. Notice that by (P3) of Lemma 2.4.12 and due to the choice of {Ki}i∈Vms+1 ,
{µi}i∈Vms+1 , to prove the sufficiency of Theorem 2.2.2, we only need to show that for
each l in {1, · · · ,ms}, under the detectability condition of Theorem 2.2.2, there exists a
choice of Wl and {Ki}i∈Vl ,P1,Q1,S1 for which the estimation error dynamics (2.12) is
stable.14
Suppose that the choice of Wl and {Ki}i∈Vl\{1}, determined by Procedure 3 (Line
3-10) and Procedure 4 (Line 4-7), respectively, ensures that, with probability one, the LTI
system (2.13) is (i) strongly connected and has (ii) no unstable fixed mode, and (iii) the








is equal to |Vl|. By Theorem 2.4.10 and Remark 2.4.11, there exist matrices K1,P1,Q1,S1
with µ1 = |Vl| − 1 that, in conjunction with the chosen Wl and {Ki}i∈Vl\{1}, ensure that
the estimation error dynamics (2.12) is stable, where these matrices can be determined by
Procedure 4 (Line 8). Hence, we conclude that the detectability condition is sufficient for
the existence of an omniscience-achieving parameter choice, and for the parameter choice
determined by Procedure 3 and Procedure 4 to be omniscience-achieving with probability
one. It remains to prove the arguments (i)-(iii).
Proof of (i): Suppose that the transfer function matrix given by
Ci
(
z · I|Vl|·n −Wl ⊗ A
)−1
Bj (2.15)
is zero for some i, j in Vl, or equivalentlyCi (Wl ⊗ A)k Bj = 0 holds for all nonnegative
14From the overall estimation error dynamics for (2.1), it can be verified that if (2.12) is stable for every
l in {1, · · · ,ms}, then it holds that limk→∞ ‖x̂i(k)− x(k)‖ = 0 for all i ∈ Vms+1.
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integer k. This yields that







k = 0 (2.16)
where we use the fact thatBj = ej⊗In and Ci = eTi ⊗Ci. Since Gl is strongly connected,
due to the choice of Wl by Procedure 3 (Line 3-10), we can see that eTi W
k0
l ej 6= 0 for a
positive integer k0, and hence CiAk0 = 0 holds. However, this contradicts the fact that A
is nondegenerate and Ci is nonzero (see Section 2.1.2). Therefore, the transfer function
matrix (2.15) is nonzero for all i, j in Vl which, by definition, implies that the system
(2.13) is strongly connected with probability one.
Proof of (ii): Let us define B =
(











According to Proposition 2.4.8, we need to show that the following inequality holds for




Wl ⊗ A− λ · I|Vl|·n BJ
CJc 0

 ≥ |Vl| · n (2.17)
where J is an arbitrary subset of Vl, and Jc = Vl \ J is its complement.
Suppose that J is not empty then by (P1), (P2) of Lemma 2.4.12 and by the defini-










Wl ⊗ A− λ · I|Vl|·n BJ
)
= |Vl| · n (2.18)
Otherwise, since Jc = Vl, by (P1), (P2) of Lemma 2.4.12, by the definition of C, and by
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Wl ⊗ A− λ · I|Vl|·n
C

 = |Vl| · n (2.19)
Therefore, from (2.18) and (2.19), we can observe that the inequality in (2.17) holds for
every unstable eigenvalue λ of Wl ⊗ A, and by Proposition 2.4.8 the system (2.13) has
no unstable fixed mode with probability one.
Proof of (iii): To verify this, we consider a matrix given by
(
B1 (Wl ⊗ A)B1 · · · (Wl ⊗ A)|Vl|−1B1
)
(2.20)
Note that (2.20) can be rewritten as
((






In, A, · · · , A|Vl|−1
)
(2.21)
where we use the fact that B1 = e1 ⊗ In.
By the nondegeneracy of A, the rank of the matrix in (2.20) equals
rank
(
e1 Wle1 · · · W|Vl|−1l e1
)
· n
and by (P1) of Lemma 2.4.12, we can see that the matrix in (2.20) has rank |Vl|·n. Hence,
the following matrix has generic rank |Vl|·n, i.e., for almost every choice of {Ki}i∈Vl\{1},























Therefore, due to the choice of {Ki}i∈Vl\{1} by Procedure 4 (Line 4-7), the controllability
index of (2.14) is equal to |Vl| with probability one. 
2.5 Application to Tracking of Animal Groups and Experimental Results
In this section, we apply the proposed distributed estimation scheme to tracking of
animal groups, and show preliminary experimental results using a data set collected from
the deployment of animal-borne wireless camera network in the Gorongosa National Park
(Mozambique) in August 2015.15 The main purpose of the development and deployment
of the system was to collect biologically meaningful measurements and videos using GPS,
IMU, and Camera all integrated in a single tracking device, where the proposed estima-
tion scheme can be used to determine how to fuse sensor measurements and location
estimates of tracking devices within the network so that each tracking device in the net-
work learns locations of all other devices connected to the same communication network
(see Figure 2.5). The sensor measurements and videos are used to study animal group
motion. During the deployment, 15 tracking devices were installed on waterbucks and
water buffaloes. Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 show GPS tracks of 4 water buffaloes (Buffalo
1, 2, 3, 4).
15The development and deployment of animal-borne wireless camera network were performed under a
research grant NSF ECCS 1135726.
Disclaimer: The author of this dissertation was NOT involved in the deployment in the Gorongosa National
Park.
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Figure 2.5: System overview of the tracking device in the animal-borne wireless camera
network
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Figure 2.6: A screenshot of GPS tracks of water buffaloes in the Google earth
(Timespan: 2015-08-06T00:00:00Z ∼ 2015-08-06T04:00:00Z)
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x-coordinate (meters)























Figure 2.7: Original trajectories of water buffaloes in a local North East Up (NEU) co-
ordinate system (The origin of the coordinate system: Latitude = -18.9279877268328,
Longitude = 34.5457567343343)
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To represent animal group motion, we adopt a continuous-time LTI model described
by the following state-space equation: For each i in {1, · · · , 4},
ṗ(i)x (t) = v
(i)
x (t) (2.23a)
ṗ(i)y (t) = v
(i)
y (t) (2.23b)





v(i)x (t)− v(j)x (t)
)
(2.23c)
























denote the location and velocity of
Buffalo i, respectively. We have assumed that aij = aji for all i, j in {1, · · · , 4}, and
that a node (observer) is associated with each water buffalo and the location and velocity
measurements of each buffalo are available to its associated node every 10 seconds. By
discretizing (2.23), we obtain a discrete-time LTI model described as follows:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) (2.24a)
yi(k) = Cix(k) (2.24b)

























and the system matrices A and Ci are determined as follows:









0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −∑j 6=1 a1j 0 a12 0 a13 0 a14
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 a21 0 −
∑
j 6=2 a2j 0 a23 0 a24
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 a31 0 a32 0 −
∑
j 6=3 a3j 0 a34
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1






and ei is the i-column of I4. Note that, according to Ci, each node has access to the
location and velocity of its associated buffalo.
In practice, the model (2.24) may include a noise term w(k) which is due to the
un-modeled dynamics of animal motion:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + w(k)
yi(k) = Cix(k)





whereN is the number of available location and velocity measurements, and the resulting
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Figure 2.8: A communication graph G for designing a distributed observer.
choice of aij is given by
a12 = a21 = 0.002
a13 = a31 = 0.002
a14 = a41 = 0
a23 = a32 = 0.001
a24 = a42 = 0
a34 = a43 = 0.003
To design a distributed observer, we assume that the communication graph G is pre-
selected as depicted in Figure 2.8. We find the omniscience-achieving parameter based on








of the original trajectory of each buffalo, depicted in Figure 2.7, by
every node; and Figure 2.10 shows normalized estimation error computed by
1

























































































































Figure 2.9: Estimated trajectories of water buffaloes using the proposed distributed esti-
mation scheme in a local NEU coordinate system
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time (k)




















































































Figure 2.10: Normalized estimation error at every node (Total traveled distance:
Buffalo 1 = 1694 m, Buffalo 2 = 1505.8 m, Buffalo 3 = 1981.8 m, Buffalo 4 = 2129 m)
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2.6 Summary and Future Work
We described a parametrized class of LTI distributed observers for state estimation
of a LTI plant, where the information exchange among the members of a distributed ob-
server is constrained by a pre-selected communication graph. We developed necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of a parameter choice for a distributed observer
that ensures asymptotic omniscience and satisfies the scalability constraint (1.2). These
conditions can be described by the detectability of the subsystems of the plant that are
associated with the source components of the graph.
As a future direction, we suggest performance analysis of the proposed scheme and
parameter optimization to minimize estimation error in the presence of noise in measure-
ment and communication link. Also it is important to consider distributed state estimation
over time-varying communication graphs.
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Chapter 3: Optimal Remote State Estimation of Markov Processes
3.1 Problem Formulation
3.1.1 Notation and Terminologies
• For elements a1, · · · , aN of X, we define a1:N def= (a1, · · · , aN).
• For functions A1, · · · ,AN , we define A1:N def= (A1, · · · ,AN).
• When the random variable Rk is dictated by a policy T k, we use same superscript














j ∈ {1, · · · , k − 1}
∣∣∣Rj = 1
}
if Rj = 1 for some j ∈ {1, · · · , k − 1}
0 otherwise
The value of τk indicates the most recent time when a transmission has occurred




In this section, we describe the problem formulation considered throughout the
work in which we seek transmission policies T 1:N and (state) estimation rules E1:N that
dictate decision making of the sensing unit and estimator, respectively, and that are op-
timal for the cost functional (1.5). Throughout the work, without loss of optimality, we
consider that transmission policies and estimation rules have the following structures1:
The transmission policy at time k depends only on the last transmission time τk, the infor-
mation xτk transmitted to the estimator at time τk, and the current state xk of the process.
In particular, we adopt a class of randomized transmission policies.2 The estimation rule
at time k depends only on the last transmission time τk and the information xτk received
from the sensing unit at time τk. Given a transmission policy T k and an estimation rule
Ek, the decision variables Rk and x̂k are dictated by T k and Ek, respectively, as follows:





Ek (τk,xτk) if Rk = 0
xk otherwise
(3.1b)
1We do not lose optimality of resulting solutions from the imposition of these structures. This can be
verified by similar arguments as in Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 of [70].
2See Appendix B.2 for a detailed description of randomized policies.
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We formally state our main problem as follows.
Problem 3.1.1. Given a Markov process {xk}Nk=0, find optimal transmission policies
T 1:N and estimation rules E1:N for the cost functional given by





d2 (xk, x̂k) + ck ·Rk




We consider two notions of optimality for solutions of Problem 3.1.1 described as
follows.
Definition 3.1.2. Transmission policies T ∗1:N and estimation rules E∗1:N are said to be
jointly optimal for (3.2) if they achieve the global minimum for every x0 in X.
Definition 3.1.3. Transmission policies T ∗1:N and estimation rules E∗1:N are said to be
person-by-person optimal for (3.2) if the following relations hold for every x0 in X:





J (x0,T ∗1:N , E1:N) (3.3)
Equation (3.3) implies that given decision functions T ∗1:N of one player (sensing unit),
E∗1:N are the best decision functions of the other player (estimator), and vice versa.
We maintain the following assumptions throughout the work.
3The initial condition x0 = x0 and the process model is common knowledge to both the sensing unit
and estimator.
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Assumption 3.1.4. (X, d) is a complete, separable, proper metric space.4
Assumption 3.1.5. Let pk : X×B→ R be a transition probability of the process, where
B is the Borel σ-algebra generated by the metric topology associated with (X, d). We
assume that the following are true:
1. For every non-empty open set O in B, the function x 7→ pk (x,O) is positive for all
x in X.
2. For each A in B, the function x 7→ pk (x,A) is continuous.
Assumption 3.1.6. For each j in {k − 1, · · · , N}, k in {1, · · · , N}, and xk−1 in X, we
assume that there is a transformation Mj(k − 1, xk−1, ·) : X→ X for which
1. It holds that Mk−1 (k − 1, xk−1, xk−1) = 0.
2. The function xj 7→Mj (k − 1, xk−1, xj) is continuous and has a continuous inverse.
We denote the inverse by M−1j (k − 1, xk−1, ·).







x′j−1 = Mj−1(k − 1, xk−1, xj−1)
A′ = Mj (k − 1, xk−1,A)
4For notional convenience, we suppose that 0 ∈ X.
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4. The metric d is invariant under Mj , i.e., it holds that
d (xj, x̂j) = d (Mj(k − 1, xk−1, xj),Mj(k − 1, xk−1, x̂j))
for all xj, x̂j in X.
To find a solution to Problem 3.1.1, we divide the problem into a set of N sub-
problems, and sequentially solve each sub-problem. We proceed by describing the so-
called Two-Player Optimal Stopping Problem from time k, and show how each sub-
problem can be related to the optimal stopping problem.
Problem 3.1.7. Suppose that a Markov process {xj}Nj=k−1 with a transition probability





are given. Find optimal policies T <k−1>k:N




















j ∈ {k, · · · , N}
∣∣∣Rj = 1
}
if Rj = 1 for some j ∈ {k, · · · , N}
N otherwise
The policy T <k−1>j : X×X→ {0, 1} and the rule E<k−1>j : X→ X, respectively, dictate
Rj and x̂j as follows:









We adopt two notions of optimality for Problem 3.1.7 as follows.
Definition 3.1.8. Policies T ∗<k−1>k:N and rules E∗<k−1>k:N are said to be jointly optimal for
(3.4) if they achieve the global minimum for every xk−1 in X.
Definition 3.1.9. Policies T ∗<k−1>k:N and rules E∗<k−1>k:N are said to be person-by-person







































Problem 3.1.7 can be viewed as a team decision problem [71] in which two players
are involved and the main objective is to find optimal decision functions T <k−1>k:N and
E<k−1>k:N for the players. Note that the total expected cost (3.4) consists of a running cost
d2 (xj, x̂j) and a stopping cost c′j .
Remark 3.1.10. In Section 3.2, we show that using the transformation described in As-
sumption 3.1.6, the value of (3.4) evaluated at an optimal solution does not depend on
the initial condition xk−1 = xk−1 (see Remark 3.2.2).
Remark 3.1.11. For any polices T <k−1>k:N and rules E<k−1>k:N , if c′j ≤ c′′j holds for all j in
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l ∈ {j + 1, · · · , N}
∣∣∣Rl = 1
}
if Rl = 1 for some l ∈ {j + 1, · · · , N}
N otherwise
With the stopping costs {c′j}Nj=k determined by (3.8), find a solution T <k−1>k:N and E<k−1>k:N
to Problem 3.1.7.












Our main strategy in solving Problem 3.1.1 can be described as follows: We solve































solution T <k−1>k:N and E<k−1>k:N
Remote Estimation Problem
(Problem 3.1.1)
T 1:N and E1:N determined by (3.9)
is a solution to Problem 3.1.1
Figure 3.1: The problem solving strategy for Problem 3.1.1





. Once solutions to all the Sub-problems are found,
we determine transmission policies T 1:N and estimation rules E1:N for Problem 3.1.1 in
the following way:
T j(k − 1, xk−1, xj) = T <k−1>j (xk−1, xj) (3.9a)
Ej(k − 1, xk−1) = E<k−1>j (xk−1) (3.9b)
for each j in {k, · · · , N} and k in {1, · · · , N}.
In Section 3.2, we solve Sub-problem k. In particular, we show that there exists
a jointly optimal solution and describe an iterative procedure for finding a person-by-
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person optimal solution. In Section 3.3, based on the results of Section 3.2, we verify
that the transmission policies and estimation rules determined by (3.9) are a solution to
Problem 3.1.1. The diagram in Figure 3.1 depicts the aforementioned problem solving
strategy.
3.1.3 Comparative Survey of Related Work
The effect of communication costs in remote state estimation problems was studied
in [70, 72–78]. Finite time-horizon problem formulations are consider in [70, 74, 76, 78].
The authors of [74] found a jointly optimal solution for first-order linear processes driven
by Gaussian noise where it is shown that the transmission policy for jointly optimal solu-
tions is of threshold-type. An iterative procedure for finding a transmission policy and es-
timation rule for first-order linear processes is proposed in [70]. The authors performed a
convergence analysis on the proposed procedure for first-order linear processes driven by
Gaussian noise, which essentially provides an alternative proof of the main result of [74].
The work of [76] considered a problem setting where the sensing unit has energy har-
vesting capability. The authors showed that the transmission policy for jointly optimal
solutions is of threshold-type for a certain class of multi-dimensional linear processes.
Preliminary results of our work were presented in [78] for linear processes.
Infinite time-horizon formulations are considered in [72, 73, 75, 77]. The authors
of [72] studied the structure of optimal transmission policies for linear processes driven by
Gaussian noise, and proposed a procedure to compute an optimal policy based on a value
iteration algorithm. In [73], an algorithm for finding a sub-optimal solution was proposed.
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For linear processes driven by Gaussian noise, the authors showed that the cost incurred
by the proposed algorithm is within a constant factor of the optimum. While the question
of whether the transmission policy for jointly optimal solutions is of threshold-type for
multi-dimensional linear processes remains unanswered, the authors of [75] analyzed the
performance of threshold-type transmission policies for such processes. A computation-
ally efficient method for finding a sub-optimal transmission policy based on polynomial
approximation is proposed in [77].
Other interesting remote estimation schemes are reported in [79–92]. The authors
of [79] studied the structure of optimal transmission policies and estimation rules for the
case where a finite number of transmissions is allowed to the sensing unit. The authors
of [80] considered a problem setting where the sensing unit operates with two different
sensing qualities, and found an optimal time-periodic transmission policies for linear pro-
cesses driven by Gaussian noise. A remote estimation problem for continuous dynamical
systems are studied in [85] where performance of various types of transmission policies
is investigated. Results of [85] indicate that for remote estimation under a communica-
tion rate constraint, the transmission policy for jointly optimal solutions may not be of
threshold-type. A framework in which the sensing unit observes noisy outputs of the
process and transmits observed noisy outputs to the estimator is adopted in [83, 84, 87].
On the other hand, a framework in which the sensing unit accesses noisy observations of
the state of the process and transmits its best state estimate to the estimator is adopted
in [81,82,89]. The authors of [92] adopted a certain class of stochastic transmission poli-
cies which ensures that linear estimation rules are optimal. The authors of [86] proposed
an approximate state estimation scheme based on a sum of Gaussians approach. Remote
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estimation over shared communication networks is considered in [90]. A problem of
scheduling transmission power level for remote estimation was recently studied in [91].
The problem formulation considered in this work is technically different from pre-
vious ones found in literature in following ways:
1. We adopt random process models that may neither be linear nor have unimodal or
symmetric probability distributions.
2. We consider classes of transmission policies and estimation rules on which no struc-
tural assumption is imposed under which the optimality of resulting solutions is
lost.
3. We investigate optimization of the given performance criteria over both transmis-
sion policies and estimation rules.
3.2 Two-Player Optimal Stopping Problem
In this section, we find a solution to Sub-problem k where the constants {c′j}Nj=k











ing sub-problems – Sub-problem k + 1 to Sub-problem N . We consider two notions of
optimality – joint optimality and person-by-person optimality. Our main results state the
existence of a jointly optimal solution (Section 3.2.2) and describe an iterative procedure
to find a person-by-person optimal solution (Section 3.2.3).
We proceed by re-writing (3.4) into a suitable form using the following Definition.
Definition 3.2.1. Define a (random) function Pj : X→ {0, 1} and a variable x̂j ∈ X for
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each j in {k, · · · , N} as follows:5
Pj (xj) = T <k−1>j (0, xj) (3.10a)
x̂j = E<k−1>j (0) (3.10b)
We refer to Pj and x̂j as the (randomized) policy6 and estimate at time j (for the initial
condition xk−1 = 0), respectively.
Given that xk−1 = 0, we can re-write (3.4) as follows:
Exk [Jk (xk,Pk:N , x̂k:N)] (3.11)
where for each j in {k, · · · , N},
Jj (xj,Pj:N , x̂j:N)
=
(
d2 (xj, x̂j) + Exj+1
[
Jj+1 (xj+1,Pj+1:N , x̂j+1:N)
∣∣∣xj
])
· (1−Rj) + c′j ·Rj
(3.12)
with JN+1 = 0, and Pj dictates Rj as follows:
Rj = Pj (xj) (3.13)
Note that Jj satisfies
Exj
[
Jj (xj ,Pj:N , x̂j:N )






d2 (xj , x̂j)




Jj+1 (xj+1,Pj+1:N , x̂j+1:N )





∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
)
+ c′j · P
(
Rj = 1
∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
)
(3.14)
5As k is fixed in Sub-problem k, throughout the section, we drop the dependence of policies and esti-
mates on k.
6See Appendix B.2 for a detailed description of randomized policies.
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for all j in {k, · · · , N}.
Remark 3.2.2. Let P∗k:N and x̂∗k:N be optimal policies and estimates for (3.11), respec-





































with J∗N+1 = 0.





k − 1, xk−1, x̂∗j
)
(3.17)
for each j in {k, · · · , N}, where Mj is the transformation described in Assumption 3.1.6.
















This implies that the value of (3.4) evaluated at an optimal solution does not depend on
the initial condition, and by finding an optimal solution to (3.11), we can derive a solution
to Sub-problem k using the following relation:
T <k−1>j (xk−1, xj) = P∗j (Mj (k − 1, xk−1, xj)) (3.18a)
E<k−1>j (xk−1) = M−1j
(





Based on Remark 3.2.2, to solve Sub-problem k, we will find optimal policies and
estimates for the initial condition xk−1 = 0, and derive a solution to Sub-problem k using
(3.18).
3.2.1 Definitions and Preliminary Results
We restate Definition 3.1.8 and Definition 3.1.9 as follows.
Definition 3.2.3. Policies P∗k:N and estimates x̂∗k:N are said to be a jointly optimal solu-
tion for (3.11) if they achieve the global minimum.
Definition 3.2.4. Policies P∗k:N and estimates x̂∗k:N are said to be a person-by-person











k:N , x̂k:N)] (3.19)
Equation (3.19) implies that given decision functions P∗k:N of one player (sensing unit),
x̂∗k:N are optimal decision variables of the other player (estimator), and vice versa.
To find an optimal solution for (3.11), we define best response mappings P and X
as follows.
Definition 3.2.5. Given estimates x̂k:N , define P (x̂k:N) as a collection of policies Pk:N
for which it holds that
Exk [Jk (xk,Pk:N , x̂k:N)] = minP ′k:N
Exk [Jk (xk,P
′
k:N , x̂k:N)] (3.20)
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Definition 3.2.6. Given policies Pk:N , define X (Pk:N) as a collection of estimates x̂k:N
for which it holds that
Exk [Jk (xk,Pk:N , x̂k:N)] = min
x̂′k:N
Exk [Jk (xk,Pk:N , x̂′k:N)] (3.21)
Definition 3.2.7. Policies Pk:N are said to be degenerate if there exists j0 ∈ {k, · · · , N}




∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj0−1 = 0
)
= 0 (3.22)
Remark 3.2.8. Let Pk:N be degenerate policies for which (3.22) holds. Then, from (3.14),
we can derive that
Exj0
[
Jj0 (xj0 ,Pj0:N , x̂j0:N)
∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj0−1 = 0
]
= c′j0 (3.23)
Proposition 3.2.9. Consider that policies Pk:N and estimates x̂k:N are given. Suppose
that the policies are non-degenerate. Then Pk:N belong to P (x̂k:N) if and only if
Exj
[
Jj (xj,Pj:N , x̂j:N)





∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
]
(3.24)
holds for all j in {k, · · · , N}, where
J∗j (xj, x̂j:N) = min
{








with J∗N+1 = 0.





k:N , x̂k:N)] = Exk [J
∗
k (xk, x̂k:N)]
We omit the detail for brevity.
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0 if xj ∈ Dj
1 otherwise
(3.26)
























Then it holds that Pk:N ∈P (x̂k:N).
Remark 3.2.11. Given estimates x̂k:N , let Pk:N be non-degenerate policies for which










∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 1
)
= 0
where Dj and Dj are given in (3.27).
Proposition 3.2.12. Consider that policies Pk:N and estimates x̂k:N are given. Suppose















) ∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
]
(3.28)
holds for all j in {k, · · · , N}.
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The proof follows from (3.14) and Definition 3.2.6. We omit the detail for brevity.
Corollary 3.2.13. Given non-degenerate policies Pk:N , consider estimates x̂k:N defined
by





∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
]
(3.29)
for each j in {k, · · · , N}. Then it holds that x̂k:N ∈ X (Pk:N).
Proposition 3.2.14. Consider functions {Gj}Nj=k defined by






where J∗j is given in (3.25). {Gj}Nj=k are all continuous functions.7
The proof is given in Appendix B.4. The following is a consequence of Proposi-
tion 3.2.14.
Corollary 3.2.15. Given estimates x̂k:N , the sets Dj and Dj defined in (3.27) are closed
and open, respectively, for all j in {k, · · · , N}.
3.2.2 Existence of a Jointly Optimal Solution
Let us define
G (x̂k:N) def= Exk [J∗k (xk, x̂k:N)] (3.31)




7Note that Gj is a function defined on XN−j+2. See Appendix B.1 for some remarks on the continuity
of functions on a product space.
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Proposition 3.2.16. Let x̂∗k:N be the estimates that achieve the global minimum of (3.31).
The policies P∗k:N satisfying
P∗k:N ∈P (x̂∗k:N)
are not degenerate in the sense of Definition 3.2.7.
The proof is given in Appendix B.5.
Theorem 3.2.17. There exist estimates x̂∗k:N that achieve the global minimum of (3.31).
Furthermore, in conjunction with these estimates x̂∗k:N , the policies P∗k:N satisfying
P∗k:N ∈P (x̂∗k:N)
are a jointly optimal solution for (3.11).
To prove Theorem 3.2.17, we need the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.2.18. There exists a compact set K ⊂ XN−k+1 for which
min
x̂k:N∈K
G (x̂k:N) ≤ G (x̂′k:N)
holds for all x̂′k:N in XN−k+1.
The proof is given in Appendix B.5.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.17: Recall the definitions of Gk and G given in (3.30) and (3.31),
respectively. According to Proposition 3.2.14 and by the fact that G (x̂k:N) = Gk (0, x̂k:N),
we can see that G is a continuous function. Due to Lemma 3.2.18, in what regards
to finding a global minimizer of G, we may assume that the domain of G is compact.
Hence, by the continuity of G and compactness of its domain, there exist estimates
x̂∗k:N that achieve the global minimum of G. Let us choose policies P∗k:N satisfying
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P∗k:N ∈ P (x̂∗k:N) using, for instance, Corollary 3.2.10. Since x̂∗k:N is a global mini-
mizer of G and P∗k:N ∈ P (x̂∗k:N) holds, we conclude that the solution P∗k:N and x∗k:N is
jointly optimal for (3.11). 
3.2.3 Iterative Procedure for Finding a Person-by-Person Optimal Solu-
tion
As numerically illustrated in [70], the function G in (3.31) may be non-convex, and
finding a jointly optimal solution to (3.11) would be computationally intractable. Instead,
in this section, we seek a person-by-person optimal solution to (3.11). An iterative pro-
cedure for finding such a solution is described in Procedure 1, where η is a pre-selected
non-negative constant that determines a stopping criterion of the procedure.
71
Procedure 1: Finding a Person-by-Person Optimal Solution
input : η ≥ 0, x̂(0)k:N




2 j ← N
3 while j ≥ k do
4 Choose P(1)j using (3.26)
5 j ← j − 1
6 i← 0
7 repeat
8 i← i+ 1
9 j ← k
10 while j ≤ N do
11 Choose x̂(i)j using (3.29)
12 j ← j + 1
13 j ← N
14 while j ≥ k do
15 Choose P(i+1)j using (3.26)















In what follows, we analyze convergence properties of the sequence of solutions
computed by Line 8 − 16 of Procedure 1. We first define convergence of policies and
estimates. To proceed, for each A in B, let us define
µ
(i)
j|j (A) = P
(
xj ∈ A




µj|j (A) = P
(
xj ∈ A







be a sequence of policies. The sequence is said to


















∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
)
(3.32b)
for all j in {k, · · · , N}. In addition, two sets of policies Pk:N and P ′k:N are said to be













∣∣∣R′k = 0, · · · ,R′j−1 = 0
)
(3.33b)
for all j in {k, · · · , N}.
8See Definition B.3.6 for the weak convergence of probability measures.
9µj|j = µ
′
j|j implies that µj|j (A) = µ
′
j|j (A) holds for all A in B.
73





be a sequence of
policies that converge to Pk:N and P ′k:N . Then the two sets of the policies Pk:N and
P ′k:N are equal. To see this, using the definition of the weak convergence of probability







for every bounded, continuous function g : X → R. Then, by applying Lemma 9.3.2








be a sequence of estimates. The sequence is said to










for all j in {k, · · · , N}. In addition, two sets of estimates x̂k:N and x̂′k:N are said to be








for all j in {k, · · · , N}.



























To proceed, we make the following assumption.
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be a sequence of solutions satisfying





























has a convergent subsequence, and the limit of any convergence subse-
quence is a person-by-person optimal solution.
To prove Theorem 3.2.23, we need the following Lemma.































has a convergent subsequence, and the limit Pk:N of any
convergence subsequence satisfies Pk:N ∈P (x̂′k:N).
The proof is given in Appendix B.6.








is contained in a compact set. By the compactness, there










































To complete the proof, it remains to show that Pk:N and x̂k:N constitute a person-
by-person optimal solution, i.e., it holds that
Pk:N ∈P (x̂k:N) (3.39a)
x̂k:N ∈ X (Pk:N) (3.39b)
Equation (3.39b) is ensured by Assumption 3.2.22, and it remains to show that (3.39a) is
true.
To see this, by contradiction, suppose that Pk:N /∈ P (x̂k:N) holds. Note that by
Lemma 3.2.24, Pk:N belong to P (x̂′k:N). Then we can see that the following relations
hold for policies P ′k:N satisfying P ′k:N ∈P (x̂k:N):
G (x̂k:N) = Exk [Jk (xk,P ′k:N , x̂k:N)]
(1)
< Exk [Jk (xk,Pk:N , x̂k:N)]
(2)
≤ Exk [Jk (xk,Pk:N , x̂′k:N)] = G (x̂′k:N) (3.40)
(1) follows from the hypothesis that Pk:N /∈ P (x̂k:N); and (2) is due to (3.39b). On the


























= α for some real number α. In
conjunction with the continuity of G (see Proposition 3.2.14), this implies that
G (x̂k:N) = G (x̂′k:N) = α
which contradicts (3.40). Therefore we conclude that Pk:N ∈P (x̂k:N). 
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3.3 Optimal Remote State Estimation
Based on the results of Section 3.2, we find a solution to Problem 3.1.1. To proceed,
consider a procedure described in Procedure 2.












2 k ← N
3 while k ≥ 1 do















to Sub-problem k + 1 to
Sub-problem N .






obtain in Step 1.
6 k ← k − 1











be solutions to Sub-problems
obtained via Procedure 2. For each k in {1, · · · , N}, if T ∗<k−1>k:N and E∗<k−1>k:N are a
jointly optimal (person-by-person optimal) solution of Sub-problem k, then the transmis-
sion policies T ∗1:N and the estimation rules E∗1:N determined by
T ∗j(k − 1, xk−1, xj) = T ∗<k−1>j (xk−1, xj) (3.41a)
E∗j (k − 1, xk−1) = E∗<k−1>j (xk−1) (3.41b)
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for each j in {k, · · · , N} and k in {1, · · · , N} are jointly optimal (person-by-person
optimal) for (3.2).
The proof is given in Appendix B.7
3.4 Application to Specific System Models
In this section, we apply our main results to linear system models and self-propelled
particle models.
3.4.1 Linear System Models
Consider
xk+1 = Akxk + wk (3.42)
where wk is a random variable with a Gaussian distribution in Rn. We define the metric
d using the Euclidean norm ‖·‖2 as d (xk, x′k) = ‖xk − x′k‖2. We note that the metric is
invariant under the transformation defined by




for j in {k − 1, · · · , N} and k in {1, · · · , N}, where we adopt the convention that
∏j−1
l=k−1Al = In if j = k− 1. It can be verified that Assumption 3.1.4 - Assumption 3.1.6
hold.
With the Euclidean norm, it is straight-forward to see that for given polices Pk:N ,
for each j in {k, · · · , N},












∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
]
(3.43)
are equivalent, provided that Exj
[
‖xj − x̂j‖2
∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
]
is well-defined for
all x̂j in Rn. In the following Proposition, we show that the statement in Assump-
tion 3.2.22 is valid for the linear system models.















































Pk:N , x̂k:N , and x̂′k:N , respectively. Then it holds that x̂k:N ∈ X (Pk:N).
Proof. Let µ(i)j|j and µj|j be probability measures defined as
µ
(i)
j|j (A) = P
(
xj ∈ A





µj|j (A) = P
(
xj ∈ A
∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
)
(3.46)
where A belongs to B, and the random variables R(i)j and Rj are dictated by P
(i)
j and





converges to Pk:N , it holds that µ(il)j|j
w−→ µj|j for all








and the Skorokhod representation theorem [94], there exist







and a random variable yj all defined on a
common probability space (Ω,F, ν) in which the following three facts are true:
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(F1) µ(il)j|j is the probability measure of y
(il)
j , i.e., ν
({
ω ∈ Ω





for each A in B.





= µj|j (A) for








converges to yj almost surely.





























is a convergent sequence, it is bounded. By Remark 3.2.11, (3.44a),
and Lemma B.3.9, there is a compact set Kj for which µ(il)j|j (Kj) = 1 for all l in N. Hence,










} x dµ(il)j|j = 0 (3.48)




































∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
]
(3.50)
Since this holds for every j in {k, · · · , N}, by Proposition 3.2.12, we conclude that
x̂k:N ∈ X (Pk:N).












p1,k + rk · cos (θk + φk)





where p1,k, p2,k take values in R, and θk takes a value in [−π, π). rk and φk are random
variables with a Weibull distribution and Wrapped Cauchy distribution, respectively. We

























cos θk − sin θk p1,k







cos θ′k − sin θ′k p′1,k




































cos θk−1 sin θk−1 0












It can be verified that Assumption 3.1.4 - Assumption 3.1.6 hold.





















)) ∣∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
]
(3.52)
provided that the conditional expectation is well-defined for all x̂j in R × R × [−π, π).













































∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
]
(3.53d)














is non-zero. In this case, there exists a unique θ̂j that satisfies (3.53c) and (3.53d). If
both (3.54a) and (3.54b) are zero, then the value of (3.52) does not depend on θ̂j . In the
following Proposition, we show that the statement in Assumption 3.2.22 is valid for the
self-propelled particle models.















































Pk:N , x̂k:N , and x̂′k:N , respectively. Then it holds that x̂k:N ∈ X (Pk:N).


























































∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
]
(3.56d)










∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
]
(3.58)














































































































































∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
]
Note that by Proposition 3.2.12 and (3.53), it holds that x̂∗k:N ∈ X (Pk:N). From (3.56)






















Therefore, we conclude that x̂k:N ∈ X (Pk:N).
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If both (3.57) and (3.58) are zero, then the value of (3.52) does not depend on θ̂j ,









∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
]
This can be verified by similar arguments given above and (3.56).
3.5 Application to Animal Tracking and Experimental Results
In this section, we apply the proposed remote estimation scheme to animal tracking,
and show preliminary experimental results using a data set collected from the deployment
of animal-borne wireless camera network in the Gorongosa National Park (Mozambique)
in August 2015.10 The main purpose of the development and deployment of the system
was to collect biologically meaningful measurements and videos using GPS, IMU, and
Camera all integrated in a single tracking device, where the proposed estimation scheme
can be used to determine when to share sensor measurements between tracking devices
and how to determine the best location estimates of nearby devices (see Figure 2.5). The
sensor measurements and videos are used to study animal group motion. During the
deployment, 15 tracking devices were installed on waterbucks and water buffaloes. Figure
3.2 shows the GPS track of a water buffalo, and Figure 3.3 depicts the x-coordinate (px,k),
10The development and deployment of animal-borne wireless camera network were performed under a
research grant NSF ECCS 1135726.
Disclaimer: The author of this dissertation was NOT involved in the deployment in the Gorongosa National
Park.
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y-coordinate (py,k), and heading angle θk of a portion of the GPS track (contained in the
red rectangle in Figure 3.2) in a local North East Up (NEU) coordinate system.
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Figure 3.2: A screenshot of the GPS track of a water buffalo in the Google earth
(Timespan: 2015-08-06T00:00:00Z ∼ 2015-08-06T06:00:00Z)
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Figure 3.3: The x-coordinate (px,k), y-coordinate (py,k), and heading angle θk of a portion
of the GPS track (contained in the red rectangle in Figure 3.2) in a local NEU coordinate
system. (Timespan: 2015-08-06T05:40:00Z ∼
2015-08-06T05:53:00Z / The origin of the coordinate system :
Latitude = -18.9401136372457, Longitude = 34.5337888580266)
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We model the movement of the water buffalo using the self-propelled particle model











px,k + rk · cos (θk + φk)





We assume that the sensing unit makes a decision on transmission of information to the
estimator every 10 seconds.
The Weibull random variable rk and Wrapped Cauchy random variable φk for the














cosh γ − cos(φ− µ) (3.61b)
Using the collected GPS data, we compute the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of
the parameters for (3.61):
(a, b) = (10.3214, 5.9553)
(µ, γ) = (0.004, 0.001)
Under these parameter choices, the probability density functions are depicted in Fig-
ure 3.4.
Transmission policies and estimation rules are determined based on Procedure 1 and
Procedure 2 for the communication costs ck = 5 for all k in {1, · · · , N} with N = 78.




of the original trajectory of the buffalo,
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depicted in Figure 3.3; and Figure 3.6 shows the estimation error computed by




cos θk − sin θk px,k







cos θ̂k − sin θ̂k p̂x,k






Note that d(xk, x̂k) = 0 at time k in Figure 3.6 implies that the sensing unit transmitted
information on the full state xk of the process to the estimator, and the state estimate x̂k
at the estimator was set to the state of the process, i.e., x̂k = xk.
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(a) The probability density function of rk
φ
















(b) The probability density function of φk
Figure 3.4: Comparisons between the probability density functions of rk and φk under
the computed parameter choices and the GPS data.
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Figure 3.5: Estimated trajectory of the water buffalo by the proposed remote estimation
scheme
92
Figure 3.6: Estimation error of the remote estimation scheme
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3.6 Summary and Future Work
We have studied the remote state estimation problem formulated in Section 3.1.
To find a solution to the problem, we re-write the problem into N sub-problems and
sequentially solve each Sub-problem k. We show that optimal solutions to all the sub-
problems constitute an optimal solution to the original problem. Based on this idea, our
main results show the existence of a jointly optimal solution, and describe an iterative
procedure for finding a person-by-person optimal solution. In addition we have applied
the proposed scheme to the experimental data obtained from the real-world deployment.
As future work, we will find the convergence rate of the proposed procedure de-
scribed in Procedure 1, and if it exists, search for a new algorithm that achieves a faster
convergence rate. Also we are interested in extending the presented results to large scale
dynamical systems which may consist of multiple sensing units and estimators.
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Chapter 4: Evolutionary Game Dynamics and Passivity
4.1 Background
4.1.1 Notation








[a1]+ · · · [an]+
)T
• We denote the gradient and Hessian of a real-valued function x 7→ f(x) with respect
to x by ∇xf and ∇2xf , respectively, provided they exist.






is the set of n-dimensional element-wise non-negative (non-positive) vec-
tors. For n = 1, we omit superscript n and adopt R+ (R−).
• 1 is the vector with all entries 1, I is the identity matrix, and ei is the i-th column
of I .
• ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean norm.
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4.1.2 Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics
Consider a population of players engaged in a game where each player selects a
(pure) strategy from the set of available strategies represented by {1, · · · , n}.1 Suppose
that the population consists of a continuum of players. Population states, which describe














i=1 zi = 0
}
. A payoff vector
p ∈ Rn is assigned to each population state x: pi represents a payoff given to the i-
strategists, the players choosing strategy i. Based on this notation, we describe population
games and evolutionary dynamics in Section 4.1.2.1 and Section 4.1.2.2, respectively.
4.1.2.1 Population Games
We identify population games with payoff operators defined as follows:
p(·) = Gx(·) (4.1)
G : X → P is a causal operator where X is the set of all differentiable X-valued time-
dependent functions x(·) : R+ → X, and P is the set of all differentiable Rn-valued time-
dependent functions p(·) : R+ → Rn. Equation (4.1) suggests that a payoff trajectory p(·)
is a causal function of a population state trajectory x(·); hence, under (4.1), the payoff p(t)
1Population games, in general, account multiple populations of players, and the strategy sets are allowed
to be distinct across populations. However, for simple and clear presentation, we restrict our attention to
single-population games. Results for the single-population cases can be extended to multi-population cases.
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at each time t may depend on the entire history of a population state. We note that this
formalism of population games generalizes the conventional ones presented, for instance,
in [4, 95].
The following are a few examples of payoff operators (4.1).
Example 4.1.1. Let F be a C1 mapping from X to Rn.
Time-Delayed Payoff: p(t) = F (x(t− d))
Contrarian Effect Payoff [15]: p(t) = F (x(t))− Λ(x(t)− x(t− d))
Cumulative Payoff: ṗ(t) = F (x(t))
Anticipatory Payoff [15]: q̇(t) = λ(F (x(t))− q(t))
p(t) = F (x(t)) + k(F (x(t))− q(t))
where Λ is a matrix in Rn×n, d is a positive constant, and k, λ are real numbers. 
We adopt the notion of Nash equilibrium in the following way.2
Definition 4.1.2 (Nash Equilibrium). Let x ∈ X be a population state and p ∈ Rn be a
payoff vector assigned to it. The population state x is a Nash equilibrium if every strategy
in use receives the maximum payoff, i.e., if xi is positive then pi = maxj∈{1,··· ,n} pj holds.
4.1.2.2 Evolutionary Dynamics
Evolutionary dynamics describe how the population state evolves over time in re-
sponse to a payoff trajectory. Throughout the chapter, we consider dynamics that can be
2When a game is described by a payoff function p = F (x), Definition 4.1.2 coincides with the conven-
tional definition of Nash equilibrium.
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represented by a differential equation3 given by
ẋ = V (p, x), x(0) = x0 ∈ X (4.2)
where p(t), x(t), and ẋ(t) take values in Rn, X, and TX, respectively. We assume that the
vector field V : Rn × X → TX is well-defined in a sense that for each initial value x0 in
X and payoff trajectory p(·) in P , there exists a unique solution x(·) to (4.2) that belongs
to X .
We define the set of equilibrium points of (4.2) as
S def=
{
(p, x) ∈ Rn × X
∣∣V (p, x) = 0
}
and for each x in X, its projection on Rn × {x} as Sx def=
{
p ∈ Rn
∣∣ (p, x) ∈ S
}
. We
assume that for each x in X, the set Sx is path-connected, i.e., for every p0, p1 in Sx,
there exists a piece-wise smooth path from p0 to p1. As a case in point, consider a set
SNE that consists of (p, x) for which given the payoff p, the population state x is a Nash
equilibrium. It can be verified that if (p0, x) and (p1, x) both belong to SNE then so does
(λ · p0 + (1 − λ) · p1, x) for all λ in [0, 1]. Hence SNE satisfies the path-connectedness
assumption.
The following are a few examples of evolutionary dynamics that are found in liter-
ature.
Example 4.1.3. The replicator dynamics [9], BNN dynamics [8], Smith dynamics [96],
and logit dynamics [97] are representative instances of evolutionary dynamics. The state-
3In the literature of evolutionary game theory, it is a convention to represent evolutionary dynamics as
ẋ = V (F (x), x) to make the dependence on a payoff function F : X → Rn explicit. While, in this work,
we remove the dependence to study evolutionary dynamics under a generalized class of games (4.1).
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space representations of these dynamics are given as follows:
Replicator: ẋi = xip̂i (4.3)







xj[pi − pj]+ − xi
n∑
j=1






for each i in {1, · · · , n}, where p̂ is the excess payoff vector defined as p̂ = p − pTx · 1,
and η is a positive real number. 
4.2 Passivity of Evolutionary Dynamics
We define a notion of passivity for evolutionary dynamics (4.2), and characterize
passivity in terms of the vector field V in (4.2). Based on the characterization, we ex-
amine passivity of previously established dynamics, and investigate properties of passive
dynamics.
4.2.1 Definition of Passivity for Evolutionary Dynamics
To define passivity for (4.2), let us consider the following inequality for a C1 func-
tion SED : Rn × X→ R+ and a constant η:




ṗT (τ)ẋ(τ)− η · ẋT (τ)ẋ(τ)
]
dτ (4.7)
for t ≥ t0 ≥ 0, where x(·) ∈ X is the trajectory of the population state determined by
(4.2) in response to a payoff trajectory p(·) ∈ P . In terms of (4.7), we state the definition
of passivity as follows.
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Definition 4.2.1. Consider an evolutionary dynamic given as in (4.2).
1. The dynamic is said to be passive if there exists a C1 function SED : Rn×X→ R+
for which (4.7) holds with η = 0 for t ≥ t0 ≥ 0 and every payoff trajectory p(·) in
P .
2. The dynamic is said to be strictly passive if there exists a C1 function SED : Rn ×
X → R+ for which (4.7) holds with η = 0 for t ≥ t0 ≥ 0 and every payoff
trajectory p(·) in P , and if ∇TxSED(p, x)V (p, x) = 0 implies V (p, x) = 0.
3. The dynamic is said to be strictly output passive if there exists a C1 function SED :
Rn × X → R+ for which (4.7) holds with η > 0 for t ≥ t0 ≥ 0 and every payoff
trajectory p(·) in P .
We refer to SED as a storage function and (4.7) as the passivity inequality. Since
SED is a non-negative function, without loss of generality, we assume that
inf
(p,x)∈Rn×X
SED(p, x) = 0
It follows from Definition 4.2.1 that strict output passivity entails strict passivity and strict
passivity entails passivity.
Remark 4.2.2. The definition of passivity for evolutionary dynamics is closely related
with the notion of dissipativity from dynamical system theory [98]. To see this, let us



















y = V (p, x) (4.8b)
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Note that (4.8) is a state-space representation of a control-affine nonlinear system with
the input u, state (p, x), and output y. By the traditional notion of dissipativity [98], the
system (4.8) is dissipative with respect to the supply rate s(u, y) = uTy − η · yTy if there
exists a C1 function SED : Rn × X→ R+ for which




uT (τ)y(τ)− η · yT (τ)y(τ)
]
dτ (4.9)
holds for t ≥ t0 ≥ 0 and every real-valued function u : R+ → Rn. Then, by the
equivalence between (4.2) and (4.8), we can verify that the passivity inequality (4.7) is
satisfied for (4.2) if and only if the inequality (4.9) is satisfied for (4.8).
4.2.2 Characterization of Passivity of Evolutionary Dynamics
Let us consider the following two conditions:
∇pSED(p, x) = V (p, x) (P1)
∇TxSED(p, x)V (p, x) ≤ −η · V T (p, x)V (p, x) (P2)
where SED : Rn × X → R+ is a C1 function, V : Rn × X → TX is the vector field
given in (4.2), and η is a real number. In the following Theorem, we show that (P1) and
(P2) are passivity requirements for evolutionary dynamics. This result not only provides
an alternative definition of passivity but also is useful in studying properties of passive
evolutionary dynamics.
Theorem 4.2.3. Consider an evolutionary dynamic given as in (4.2). The following state-
ments are true:
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(S1) The dynamic is passive if and only if there exists a C1 function SED : Rn×X→ R+
for which the conditions (P1) and (P2) hold with η = 0.
(S2) The dynamic is strictly passive if and only if there exists a C1 function SED : Rn ×
X→ R+ for which the conditions (P1) and (P2) hold with η = 0, and the equality
in (P2) holds only if V (p, x) = 0 holds.
(S3) The dynamic is strictly output passive if and only if there exists a C1 function SED :
Rn × X→ R+ for which the conditions (P1) and (P2) hold with η > 0.
Proof. To prove the Theorem, as noted in Remark 4.2.2, recall that (4.2) can be rewritten
as in (4.8) and that passivity of evolutionary dynamics (4.2) is equivalent to dissipativity
of control-affine nonlinear systems (4.8) with the supply rate s(u, y) = uTy − η · yTy.
Using dissipativity characterization Theorem (see, for instance, Theorem 1 in [99]), we
can see that there exists a C1 function SED for which the conditions (P1) and (P2) hold if
and only if SED satisfies the passivity inequality (4.7) for t ≥ t0 ≥ 0 and every payoff tra-
jectory p(·) in P . The rest of the proof follows from Definition 4.2.1 and the equivalence
between passivity for (4.2) and dissipativity for (4.8).




V (p, x) • dp of the vector field V along a piece-wise smooth path
P from p0 to p1 in the direction of p. (P1) is equivalent to the fact that the value of the
integral does not depend on the choice of the path.4 Dissatisfaction of (P1) could lead to
a limit cycle and non-convergence to an equilibrium. (see Example 6.1 in [14]).
4A game-theoretic interpretation of (P1) is given in [100].
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Next, suppose that the payoff vector p(t) is constant, i.e., p(t) = p0 for all t in
R+. According to (P2), the population state x(t) evolves along a trajectory for which the
stored energy quantified by SED(p(t), x(t)) decreases. In particular, if the dynamic (4.2)
is strictly passive then we can establish asymptotic stability of the set S using LaSalle’s
theorem [101]. In Section 4.3, based on this observation, we establish stability of passive
dynamics in a class of population games.
As an application of Theorem 4.2.3, we evaluate passivity of evolutionary dynamics
found in literature. We start with the replicator dynamics.
Proposition 4.2.4. The replicator dynamics (4.3) are not passive.
The proof is given in Appendix C.1.
In what follows, we examine passivity of the EPT dynamics [102], (impartial) pair-
wise comparison dynamics [103], and PBR dynamics [97].
EPT Dynamics:
ẋi = %i(p̂)− xi · 1T%(p̂) (4.10)
where the excess payoff vector is defined as p̂ = p−pTx·1. The function % =
(
%1 · · · %n
)T
is called the revision protocol in which each entry is defined as %i : Rn → R+ and satisfies
following two conditions – Integrability (I) and Acuteness (A):
∇p̂γ(p̂) = %(p̂) for a C1 function γ : Rn → R (I)
p̂T%(p̂) > 0 if p̂ ∈ Rn \ Rn− (A)
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Proposition 4.2.5. The EPT dynamics (4.10) are strictly passive with a storage function5
SEPT (p, x) = γ(p̂)





xj%i(pi − pj)− xi
n∑
j=1
%j(pj − pi) (4.11)
The function % =
(
%1 · · · %n
)T
is called the revision protocol in which each entry is
defined as %i : R→ R+ and satisfies the following condition – Sign Preservation (SP):6





Proposition 4.2.6. [15] The pairwise comparison dynamics (4.11) are strictly passive









ẋ = C(p)− x (4.12)




, where v :
int(X) → R is a strictly convex C2 function that satisfies zT∇2xv(x)z > 0 for all x in X
and z in TX \ {0}, and ‖∇xv(x)‖ → ∞ as x → bd(X). We refer to such C as a choice
function, and to such v as an admissible (deterministic) perturbation.
5In the proof of Proposition 4.2.5, we show that there is a non-negative potential function γ that satisfies
both (I) and (A).




1 if a > 0
0 if a = 0
−1 if a < 0
.
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Proposition 4.2.7. The PBR dynamics (4.12) are strictly passive with a storage function










Suppose that v is strongly convex satisfying
zT∇2xv(x)z ≥ η′ · zT z
for all x in X and z in TX, where η′ > 0. Then the dynamics are strictly output passive
and satisfy the passivity inequality (4.7) for η = η′.
The proof is given in Appendix C.3.
4.2.3 Properties of Passive Evolutionary Dynamics
4.2.3.1 Payoff Monotonicity and Passivity
Using the characterization of passivity given in Theorem 4.2.3, we study properties
of passive evolutionary dynamics in connection with the following two conditions7 – Nash
Stationarity (NS) and Positive Correlation (PC):
V (p, x) = 0 if and only if
given the payoff p, the population state x is a Nash equilibrium (NS)
pTV (p, x) ≥ 0 holds for all (p, x) ∈ Rn × X (PC)
Consider evolutionary dynamics (4.2) in a game in which the payoff is constant, i.e.,
p(t) = p0 for all t in R+. The conditions (NS) and (PC) have the following implications:
7These conditions are previously considered in literature to establish stability of evolutionary dynamics
[14, 104].
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(PC) implies that the population state trajectory x(·) determined by (4.2) evolves along
which the average payoff pT0 x(t) is increasing, i.e.,
d
dt
pT0 x(t) ≥ 0; and (NS) implies
that the population state does not change if and only if the maximum average payoff is
attained, i.e., ẋ(t) = 0 if and only if pT0 x(t) = maxx∈X p
T
0 x. We will refer to these
phenomena as payoff monotonicity, and to the dynamics satisfying both (NS) and (PC) as
payoff monotonic.
Proposition 4.2.8. Consider passive evolutionary dynamics (4.2) with a storage function
SED : Rn × X → R+. A global minimizer of SED is an equilibrium point of (4.2). In
addition, if the dynamics satisfy (NS) then every equilibrium point of (4.2) is a global
minimizer of SED.
The proof is given in Appendix C.4.
Remark 4.2.9. According to Proposition 4.2.8, given that min(p,x)∈Rn×X SED(p, x) = 0,
the inverse image S−1ED(0) is a subset of the set S of equilibrium points of (4.2), and it is
identical to S if the dynamics satisfy (NS).
Based on Definition 4.2.1, we note that strict output passivity is a stronger notion,
and leads to stronger stability than does ordinary passivity in a sense that strictly output
passive dynamics are stable in a larger class of population games. Hence, in what regards
to achieving stability, it is desired to adopt strictly output passive dynamics. However, in
the following Proposition, we show that the evolutionary dynamics exhibiting the payoff
monotonicity cannot be strictly output passive. Therefore, the payoff monotonicity and
strict output passivity cannot be attained simultaneously.
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Proposition 4.2.10. For n ≥ 3, no payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics are strictly
output passive.
The proof is given in Appendix C.5.
The following is a direct consequence of Proposition 4.2.10.
Corollary 4.2.11. The EPT dynamics (4.10) and the pairwise comparison dynamics (4.11)
are not strictly output passive.
As it can be verified that both dynamics are payoff monotonic, the proof directly
follows from Proposition 4.2.10.
4.2.3.2 Equivalence to Closed-loop Stability
In Definition 4.2.1, we defined passivity as an input-output property of evolutionary
dynamics: Satisfaction of the passivity inequality (4.7) for each payoff trajectory (input)
p(·) in P and the population state trajectory (output) x(·) determined by (4.2) in response
to p(·). In evolutionary game theory, the main interest lies in examining the time-evolution
of the population state induced in specific games. Hence, it is more natural to define
passivity of evolutionary dynamics in connection with games of interest. To achieve
this, let us consider population games identified by cumulative payoff functions of the
following form:
ṗ(t) = F (x(t)) (4.14)
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where F admits a C1 potential function, i.e., there is a C1 function f : X → R that




we can derive that









ṗT (τ)ẋ(τ) dτ (4.16)
In the following Proposition, we show that passivity can be defined as (a weak form
of) stability of closed-loops formed by cumulative payoff functions (4.14) and evolution-
ary dynamics. This result implies that passivity of evolutionary dynamics is equivalent to
satisfaction of the passivity inequality (4.7) in the class of population games identified by
(4.14).
Proposition 4.2.12. Consider the following closed loop formed by a cumulative payoff
function (4.14) and an evolutionary dynamic (4.2):
ṗ = F (x) (4.17a)
ẋ = V (p, x) (4.17b)
The dynamic (4.2) is passive if and only if for each cumulative payoff function (4.14), the
closed-loop (4.17) has a Lyapunov functionE : Rn×X→ R+ of the formE = SG+EED,
where SG : X→ R+ is given in (4.15) and EED : Rn × X→ R+ is a fixed C1 function.
The proof is given in Appendix C.6.
The following is a direct consequence of Proposition 4.2.12, where the proof is
given in Corollary C.7.
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Corollary 4.2.13. An evolutionary dynamic (4.2) is passive if and only if there exists a C1
function SED : Rn × X→ R+ for which the passivity inequality (4.7) holds for η = 0 in
the class of population games identified by cumulative payoff functions (4.14), i.e., there
exists a C1 function SED : Rn × X→ R+ for which
SED(p(t), x(t)) ≤ SED(p(t0), x(t0)) +
∫ t
t0
F T (x(τ))ẋ(τ) dτ
holds for every function F : X→ Rn that admits a C1 potential function.
4.2.3.3 Effect of Control Costs on Passivity
Consider the total payoff function u : Rn × X→ R given by
u(p, x) = pTx− v(x) (4.18)
where a C2 function v : X → R is referred to as a control cost [105] or a deterministic
perturbation [106]. A control cost is said to be admissible if it is strictly convex satisfying
zT∇2xv(x)z > 0 for all x in X and z in TX \ {0}, and ‖∇xv(x)‖ → ∞ as x → bd (X).
Notice that when there is no control cost, i.e., v = 0, the total payoff coincides with the
average payoff. The idea of imposing control costs on the total payoff appeared in game
theory and economics to study the effect of random perturbations [97, 106] or disutility
[105] on choice models, to model human choice behavior [107], and to analyze the effect
of social norms in economic problems [108]
We consider evolutionary dynamics that depend on u, and investigate the effect of
control costs on passivity of the dynamics. We refer to the dynamics as unperturbed if
v = 0; otherwise they are called perturbed. To proceed, let us consider the state-space
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representation of evolutionary dynamics in terms of revision protocols [14]: For each i in








where %ji : Rn × X → R+ is called the revision protocol and denotes the rate at which
j-strategists switch to strategy i given a payoff p and population state x.
For instance, the revision protocols can be realized as follows:
%ji(p, x) =
[










The protocol (4.20a) depends on the (instantaneous) increase of u(p, x) when the popu-
lation state changes in the direction of ei − x; and the protocol (4.20b) depends on the
(instantaneous) increase of u(p, x) when the population state changes in the direction of
ei − ej . Based on the revision protocols (4.20a) and (4.20b), we can derive the following
evolutionary dynamics: For each i in {1, · · · , n},
ẋi =
[



























Note that when no control cost is imposed, i.e., v = 0, (4.21a) and (4.21b) become the
state-space representations of the BNN dynamics (4.4) and Smith dynamics (4.5), respec-
tively. According to Proposition 4.2.5 and Proposition 4.2.6, the unperturbed dynamics
of (4.21a) and (4.21b) are strictly passive.
Suppose that the control costs are strongly convex. Then, it can be verified that
the resulting perturbed dynamics of (4.21a) and (4.21b) are strictly output passive. In
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what follows, we formalize this idea and show how convexity of control costs affects
passivity of evolutionary dynamics. For our purpose, we consider evolutionary dynamics
(4.19) whose revision protocols depend only on the gradient∇xu(p, x) of the total payoff
function (4.18) and the population state x, i.e., %ji is a function of ∇xu(p, x) and x as in
(4.20).
Proposition 4.2.14. Consider evolutionary dynamics (4.19) whose revision protocols %ji
depend only on the gradient ∇xu(p, x) of the total payoff function (4.18) and the popu-
lation state x. Suppose that the unperturbed dynamics of (4.19) are passive. Then the
following are true:
1. If the control cost is admissible then the resulting perturbed dynamics are strictly
passive.
2. If the control cost is admissible and strongly convex then the resulting perturbed
dynamics are strictly output passive.
The proof is given in Proposition C.8.
4.3 Stability of Passive Evolutionary Dynamics
In this section, we establish stability of passive evolutionary dynamics in popula-
tion games in terms of dissipation of stored energy of the dynamics. To achieve this, we
regard evolutionary dynamics and payoff operators as dynamical systems, and we inves-
tigate population state and payoff trajectories induced by a closed-loop formed by these





ẋ(t) = V (p(t), x(t))
p
x
Figure 4.1: A closed-loop obtained by a feedback interconnection of payoff operators
(4.1) and evolutionary dynamics (4.2).
Consider population games identified by (4.1) that satisfy the following inequality




ṗT (τ)ẋ(τ)− ν · ẋT (τ)ẋ(τ)
]
dτ ≤ α (4.22)
for every population state trajectory x(·) in X and t in R+, where ν is non-negative real
number and p(·) ∈ P is a payoff trajectory determined by (4.1) in response to x(·). We
represent the closed loop formed by (4.1) and (4.2) as follows:
p(·) = Gx(·) (4.23a)
ẋ(t) = V (p(t), x(t)) (4.23b)
In the following Theorem, we state stability results for the closed-loop described by
(4.23) in which
(CL1) (4.22) holds for ν = 0, and (4.23b) is strictly passive.
8In [15], population games (4.1) satisfying (4.22) for ν = 0 are called δ-anti-passive.
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(CL2) (4.22) holds for ν > 0, and (4.23b) is strictly output passive for a constant η satis-
fying η > ν.
Theorem 4.3.1. Consider (4.23) in which (CL1) or (CL2) holds. Let SED : Rn×X→ R+


























If the time-derivative ṗ of the payoff is bounded, i.e, there is a positive real M for which
‖ṗ(t)‖ < M holds for all t in R+, then it holds that limt→∞ SED (p(t), x(t)) = 0.
The proof is given in Appendix C.9.
We note that the class of cumulative payoff functions presented in Section 4.2.3.2
satisfy (4.22). In the following Proposition, we present another class of payoff operators
that satisfy (4.22).
Proposition 4.3.2. ForC1 mappings F1 and F2, consider a (time-delayed) payoff function
given by
p(t) = F1(x(t)) + F2(x(t− d)) (4.24)
where d is a positive real.9 Suppose that
zTDF1(x)z ≤ ν1 · zT z (4.25a)
zTDF T2 (x)DF2(x)z ≤ ν22 · zT z (4.25b)




dτ < β for some positive real number
β
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hold for all x in X and z in TX, where ν1 is a real and ν2 is a non-negative real. Then,
the payoff function (4.24) satisfies (4.22) with ν = ν1 + ν2.
The proof is given in Appendix C.10.
Based on Theorem 4.3.1, in what follows, we present stability results with the EPT
dynamics (4.10), pairwise comparison dynamics (4.11), and PBR dynamics (4.12). As
the EPT dynamics and pairwise comparison dynamics are at most strictly passive, we
only consider (CL1) for these dynamics.
Proposition 4.3.3. Consider (4.23) with the EPT dynamics (4.10) in which (CL1) holds.
Let SEPT : Rn × X → R+ be a storage function of (4.10). Suppose that the revision







































%(p̂) • dp̂ is an integral of % along a piece-wise smooth path P from 0
to p̂ in the direction of p̂.10 If the time-derivative ṗ of the payoff is bounded, then it holds
that limt→∞ SEPT (p(t), x(t)) = 0.
The proof is given in Appendix C.11.
Example 4.3.4. The BNN dynamics (4.4) are the EPT dynamics with a revision protocol





10Note that by the condition (I) of the EPT dynamics,
∫
P















p̂T% (p̂) = ‖% (p̂)‖2 (4.27)
It follows from (4.26) and (4.27) that (C1) and (C2) of Proposition 4.3.3 hold. We also
note that limt→∞ SEPT (p(t), x(t)) = 0 implies limt→∞
∥∥[p̂(t)]+
∥∥ = 0. Notice that given
a payoff p, a population state x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the excess payoff
p̂ = p − pTx · 1 satisfies
∥∥[p̂]+
∥∥ = 0. Hence the convergence of SEPT implies that the
population state trajectory converges to a set of Nash equilibria.
Proposition 4.3.5. Consider (4.23) with the pairwise comparison dynamics (4.11) in
which (CL1) holds. Let SPC : Rn × X → R+ be a storage function of (4.11). Sup-
pose that the revision protocol % =
(
%1 · · · %n
)T
of (4.11) satisfies the following





























j − p(l)i , x(l)i
)
l→∞−→ 0.
where Sj(pj − pi, xi) = xi
∫ pj−pi
0
%j(s) ds. If the time-derivative ṗ of the payoff is
bounded, then it holds that limt→∞ SPC (p(t), x(t)) = 0.
The proof is given in Appendix C.12.
Example 4.3.6. The Smith dynamics (4.5) are the pairwise comparison dynamics (4.11)
with a revision protocol given by %j (pj − pi) = [pj − pi]+ and a storage function given
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j=1 xi[pj − pi]2+. We can derive the following:













j(pj − pi) (4.28c)
≥ 1
2
[xi%j(pj − pi)]2 (4.28d)
It follows from (4.28c) and (4.28d) that (C1) and (C2) of Proposition 4.3.5 hold. By the
fact that
∑n
i=1 xi [pj − pi]+ ≥ [p̂j]+, we note that limt→∞ SPC(p(t), x(t)) = 0 implies
limt→∞
∥∥[p̂(t)]+
∥∥ = 0. Hence, the convergence of SPC implies that the population state
trajectory converges to a set of Nash equilibria.
Proposition 4.3.7. Consider (4.23) with the PBR dynamics (4.12) in which (CL1) or
(CL2) holds. Let SPBR : Rn × X → R+ be a storage function of (4.12). If the time-
derivative ṗ of the payoff is bounded, then it holds that limt→∞ SPBR (p(t), x(t)) = 0.
The proof is given in Appendix C.13.
Remark 4.3.8. Due to (C.6b), by letting y = C(p), it holds that [p−∇xv(C(p))]T z = 0
for all z in TX, where C is the choice function of the PBR dynamics (4.12). Then, we can
see that the storage function (4.13) satisfies
SPBR(p, x) = ∇Tx v(y) (y − x)− (v(y)− v(x))
By strict convexity of v and by the fact that y ∈ X, we can see that
lim
t→∞
SPBR(p(t), x(t)) = 0 implies lim
t→∞
‖C(p(t))− x(t)‖ = 0
i.e., the population state trajectory converges to the best response choice C(p).
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4.4 Numerical Examples
To illustrate the main results, we provide numerical examples and simulations. We
consider two different types of examples. In the first example, we consider the replica-
tor dynamics and BNN dynamics in population games identified by a cumulative payoff
function. In the second example, we consider the BNN dynamics and logit dynamics in
the Hypnodisk game [104], which is used in the proof of Proposition 4.2.10. Simula-
tion results will show that the population state trajectories induced by the BNN dynamics
converge to a limit cycle; while the trajectories induced by the logit dynamics converge
to an equilibrium point. In addition, we examine the case in which the BNN dynamics
are perturbed by the control cost v(x) = η ·∑3i=1 xi lnxi as in (4.21a). Simulation re-
sults will show that the perturbed BNN dynamics have strong stability properties than the
unperturbed ones.
4.4.1 Replicator dynamics and BNN dynamics under a cumulative pay-
off function


















We note that under (4.29), both the replicator dynamics (4.3) and BNN dynamics (4.4)
are stationary at each element of the set given by
{
(p, x) ∈ R3 × X





The population state trajectories induced by these dynamics under (4.29) are illus-
trated in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, respectively. From the illustrations, we can observe
that for the replicator dynamics, the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the pop-
ulation state x(t) and the equilibrium 1
3
· 1 does not converge to zero; while the storage
function of the BNN dynamics converges to zero, which implies that the population state














(a) Population state trajectory on simplex X





















(b) Time-evolution of the KL divergence E(x(t)) along the trajectory
starting from (p0, x0) = (−1, 0, 1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.6)
Figure 4.2: Simulation results for the replicator dynamics under a cumulative payoff given























(a) Population state trajectory on simplex X




























(b) Time-evolution of storage function SBNN (p(t), x(t)) along the tra-
jectory starting from (p0, x0) = (−1, 0, 1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.6)
Figure 4.3: Simulation results for the BNN dynamics under a cumulative payoff given by






4.4.2 BNN dynamics and logit dynamics in the Hypnodisk game















































where θ is a smooth function as described in the proof of Proposition 4.2.10.
We note that under (4.31), both the BNN dynamics (4.4) and logit dynamics (4.6)








. The population state trajec-
tories induced by these dynamics under (4.31) are illustrated in Figure 4.4 and Figure
4.5, respectively. From the illustrations, we can observe that the logit dynamics have a
stronger stability property than do the BNN dynamics as the population state trajectory of
the former converges to the equilibrium x = 1
3
·1; while that of the latter dynamics forms
a limit cycle.
Now consider that a control cost given by v(x) = η ·∑3i=1 xi lnxi is imposed on
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where p̃ = p − ∇xv. Since v is a strongly convex function, according to Proposi-
tion 4.2.14, we can see that (4.32) is strictly output passive. The population state trajectory
induced by (4.32) under the payoff function (4.31) is depicted in Figure 4.6, which shows

















(a) Population state trajectory on simplex X































(b) Time evolution of storage function SBNN (p(t), x(t)) along the tra-
jectory starting from p0 = H(x0), x0 = (0.5203, 0.3394, 0.1403)


















(a) Population state trajectory on simplex X






























(b) Time evolution of storage function Slogit(p(t), x(t)) along the tra-
jectory starting from p0 = H(x0), x0 = (0.4677, 0.3709, 0.1614)
Figure 4.5: Simulation results for the logit dynamics (η′ = 0.36) in the Hypnodisk game
(4.31). Slogit(p, x) = maxy∈int(X)
[
pTy − η′ ·∑3i=1 yi ln yi
]













(a) Population state trajectory on simplex X































(b) Time evolution of storage function SPBNN (p(t), x(t)) along the tra-
jectory starting from p0 = H(x0), x0 = (0.4269, 0.3876, 0.1855)
Figure 4.6: Simulation results for the perturbed BNN dynamics (η′ = 0.36) in the Hypn-








4.5 Summary and Future Work
We have exploited the notion of passivity in evolutionary game theory. We have
defined passivity for evolutionary dynamics and characterized it in terms of vector fields
that define the state-space realizations of the dynamics. Based on the characterization,
we have studied certain properties of passive dynamics and established stability in a gen-
eralized class of population games. Numerical simulations are provided to illustrate the
stability results.
To benefit from the presented passivity methods, as a future direction, we suggest to
investigate the following design problems: How to design passive evolutionary dynamics
whose storage function achieves its minimum at desired states; while maintaining their
stability in population games of interest.
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Appendix A: Auxiliary Results for Chapter 2
A.1 Computational Considerations
We proceed to outlining how to find the source components of a directed graph and
how to compute an omniscience-achieving parameter choice for (2.1) that satisfies (1.2),
provided that the conditions of Theorem 2.2.2 hold.
A.1.1 Finding Source Components
In Chapter 22.5 of [109], the Strongly-Connected Components (SCC) algorithm is
described for finding all strongly connected components of a directed graph. For each
strongly connected component given by the SCC algorithm, we can check whether there
are no incoming edges from outside of it, in which case it is a source component. Since
both the SCC algorithm and subsequent checks have linear-time complexity, the overall
procedure for finding source components is a linear-time algorithm.
A.1.2 Computing an Omniscience-achieving Parameter Choice
We proceed to describing randomized procedures to compute a parameter choice
for (2.1). Under the detectability condition of Theorem 2.2.2, it follows from our anal-
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ysis in Section 2.4.3 that the parameter choice obtained from the following randomized
procedures satisfies (1.2) and is omniscience-achieving with probability one.
A.1.2.1 Computation of W = (wij)i,j∈V
Let {Gl}msl=1 with Gl = (Vl,El) be the source components of G, and let us define
Vms+1 = V \
⋃ms
l=1 Vl. We first find a spanning subgraph G ′ of G for which {Gl}
ms
l=1 are the
source components of G ′, and the subgraph of G ′ induced1 by Vms+1 has no cycle. Then
we select a weight matrix W whose sparsity pattern is consistent with G ′ and, hence, with
G.
In order to obtain G ′, we perform multiple rounds of the depth-first search on G
where each round of the search starts from a (unvisited) vertex in Vms+1 that is a neighbor
of a source component. We continue this search until every vertex in Vms+1 is visited
exactly once. The overall search operation gives a disjoint collection of directed trees.
Next, we eliminate certain edges of G to obtain a new graph G ′ such that G ′ is same as G
except that the subgraph of G ′ induced by Vms+1 is the union of the trees obtained from
the aforementioned search operation. By our construction of G ′, it can be verified that
{Gl}msl=1 are the source components of G ′, and the subgraph of G ′ induced by Vms+1 has
no cycle.
For each i in V, let N′i be the neighborhood of vertex i defined by G ′. We choose the
submatrices of W in (2.11) as described by the following randomized procedure (Proce-
dure 3). Here, we use q ∼ U (a, b) to denote a randomization in which q is the realization
of a random variable uniformly distributed in the interval (a, b). We assume that the ran-
1(V′,E′) is a subgraph of (V,E) induced by V′ ⊆ V if E′ contains every edge (i, j) in E with i, j ∈ V′.
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domizations presented in the procedure are drawn from independent random variables.
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Procedure 3: Computation of W = (wij)i,j∈V
input : G′ = (V,E′)
output: W = (wij)i,j∈V
1 begin
2 for l ∈ {1, · · · ,ms} do
/* computation of Wl in (2.11) */
3 α ∼ U (0, 1)
4 for i ∈ Vl do
5 for j ∈ Vl \ {i} do
6 if j ∈ N′i \ {i} then
7 q ∼ U
(
− 1|N′i|−1 , 0
)
8 wij ← −α · q
9 else wij ← 0




/* computation of {Wms+1,l}ms+1l=1 in (2.11) */
11 for i ∈ Vms+1 do
12 for j ∈ V do
13 if j ∈ N′i \ {i} then wij ← 1|N′i|−1
14 else wij ← 0
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It follows from Lemmas 2.4.3 - 2.4.4 and Theorem 2.4.5 that Procedure 3 will select
a weight matrix W randomly from a parametrized set for which almost all parameters
lead to a suitable choice, with the possible exception of a subset of measure zero. Our
particular choice for the distributions governing the randomizations in Procedure 3 is not
important, and any other choice that assigns null probability to a subset of measure zero
would work.
A.1.2.2 Computation of {Ki,Pi,Qi,Si}i∈V
In what follows, we describe a randomized method (Procedure 4) to choose gain
matrices {Ki,Pi,Qi,Si}i∈V that, in conjunction with W obtained from Procedure 3,
are omniscience-achieving with probability one, provided that the conditions of Theo-
rem 2.2.2 are satisfied. In fact, it follows from Theorem 2.4.10 that if the conditions of
Theorem 2.2.2 are satisfied then the procedure will be selecting from a set in which almost
all choices are omniscience-achieving.
Given a positive real c, we use K ∼ Un·r ((−c, c)n·r) to denote a randomization
leading to a matrix K in Rn×r whose entries are the realizations of n · r independent
random variables uniformly distributed in the interval (−c, c). For each i in Vl, let
Bi = ei ⊗ In and Ci = eTi ⊗ Ci, where ei is the i-th column of the |Vl|-dimensional
identity matrix. We choose {Ki,Pi,Qi,Si}i∈V as described below, where repeated ran-
domizations are drawn from independent random variables.
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Procedure 4: Computation of {Ki,Pi,Qi,Si}i∈V
input : G′ = (V,E′), W given as in (2.11), and (A,C) given as in (1.1)
output: {Ki,Pi,Qi,Si}i∈V
1 begin
2 select VR as in Definition 2.2.1
3 for l ∈ {1, · · · ,ms} do
/* computation of {Ki,Pi,Qi,Si}i∈Vl */
4 il ∈ Vl ∩ VR // a singleton
5 for i ∈ Vl \ {il} do
6 Ki ∼ Un·ri ((−c, c)n·ri)
7 µi = 0









is stable, provided they exist.
/* computation of {Ki,Pi,Qi,Si}i∈Vms+1 */
9 for i ∈ Vms+1 do
10 Ki ← 0
11 µi = 0
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A.2 Nondegeneracy of the Dynamic Matrix A
Here, we justify the nondegeneracy assumption on the dynamic matrix A in (1.1).
Suppose that the dynamic matrix A is degenerate. Let M be the real matrix for which
J = M−1AM is a real block diagonal matrix in the following form:
J = diag (J1, · · · , Jp) (A.1)
where for each i in {1, · · · , p}, the submatrix Ji is the i-th real Jordan block. In particular,
suppose that Jp0+1, · · · , Jp are all the Jordan blocks associated with the zero eigenvalue.
Notice that there exists a positive integer k0 for which Jki = 0 for all k ≥ k0 and i in
{p0 + 1, · · · , p}.









































= CM . Since the block diagonal elements of Ab are the Jordan blocks
associated with the zero eigenvalue, it holds that xb(k) = 0 for all k ≥ k0, and from (A.2)
we can derive the following state-space equation:




for k ≥ k0, where Aa is a nondegenerate matrix. For this reason, in what regards to
achieving asymptotic omniscience, we may design a distributed observer (2.1) for (A.3) to
asymptotically resolve the state xa(k), from which the state x(k) of (1.1) can be obtained






 for k ≥ k0.

















We can re-write (2.3) as follows:

































In (A.5), Fo, {F1j}maj=2, G1i, Hi are from (2.3), and A′ and B′i are defined in (2.5b) and
(2.5c), respectively.
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To achieve asymptotic synchronization of the system (2.3), we need to find a dis-
tributed controller for which the partial state x′(k) of (A.4) converges to zero as k →∞.
To find such distributed controller, we adopt the following procedure (also see Figure A.1
for an illustration):
1. Using the method described in Section 2.2, we first design a distributed observer
(2.1) for the multi-agent system (A.4) subject to the pre-selected graph G.
2. Then, using results on the synthesis of decentralized control systems, we find fully
decentralized controllers for the multi-agent/distributed observer system obtained
in Step 1.
3. Finally, we recover a distributed controller from the distributed observer and the










































Figure A.1: Diagrams depicting a design procedure for finding a distributed controller.
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Based on the aforementioned design procedure, we note that the resulting dis-













j∈Ni wijx̂j(k) + Ki (yi(k)− Cix̂i(k)) + Pizi(k)




















x̂i(k), and A and Ci are defined in (A.5).
It can be verified that (A.6) is a special case of (2.4). Hence, it remains to consider a
parameter choice for (A.6) such that the resulting distributed controller synchronizes the
system (2.3). In what follows, we describe particular choices of











for (A.6) in Appendix A.3.1 and Appendix A.3.2, respectively. A proof of Proposi-
tion 2.3.2 is then followed.
A.3.1 A Choice of W = (wij)i,j∈V, {Ki,Pi,Qi,Si}i∈V
We design a distributed observer (2.1) for the system (A.4) subject to the given

















































with Ci = eTi ⊗ Ci, (A.8)
W = (wij)i,j∈V ,
K = diag (K1, · · · ,Km) , P = diag (P1, · · · ,Pm) ,
Q = diag (Q1, · · · ,Qm) , S = diag (S1, · · · ,Sm)
In (A.8), ei is the i-th column of the m-dimensional identity matrix.
By writing (A.4) and (A.7) altogether and by omitting χ(1) from x in (A.4), we can












0 W ⊗ A−K C −P










































, ei is the i-th
column of the m-dimensional identity matrix, and A, A′, Bi, B′i and Ci are defined in
2This is valid since (A.9) does not depend on χ(1).
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, output vector x̂′i, and inputs {ui}i∈V. If there is no input, i.e., ui = 0
for all i in V, and the matrix given by






is stable, then we can see that the output x̂′i(k) converges to x
′(k) as k →∞.
The following Lemma states the stabilizability and detectability of (A.9).
Lemma A.3.1. Let a graph G = (V,E) and a LTI system (A.4) be given. Suppose that
assumptions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2.3.2 hold. We can find W, K, P, Q, S in (A.9)
for which the resulting system (A.9) is both stabilizable and detectable for all i in V.
Proof. Notice that because of (ii) of Proposition 2.3.2, by Theorem 2.2.2 and the pro-
cedures in Appendix A.1.2, we can find W, K, P, Q, S for which the matrix (A.10)
is stable. Under this choice of W, K, P, Q, S, we show the stabilizability and de-
tectability of (A.9). The stabilizability directly follows from (i) of Proposition 2.3.2. The
detectability can be verified by the fact that if ui = 0 for all i in V, then it holds that






















Consider a set of fully decentralized controllers whose state-space representation is
given as follows:















for each i in V.
Consider the closed-loop system obtained by interconnecting (A.9) and (A.11) where
the parameters W,K,P,Q,S of (A.9) are chosen as described in Lemma A.3.1. By the
stabilizability and detectability of (A.9) for all i in V, using the results on the synthesis of











for (A.11) that ensures the stability of the closed-loop system.
A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3.2










i∈V are respective parameter
choices made by the procedures described in Appendix A.3.1 and Appendix A.3.2. By
Lemma A.3.1 and the discussion in Appendix A.3.2, such parameter choices ensure the
stability of the closed-loop system resulting from an interconnection of (A.9) and (A.11).
We note that, under the same parameter choice, the stability of this closed-loop ensures
the synchronization of the multi-agent system (2.3) via the distributed controller described
by (A.6), which is a special case of (2.4). Therefore, with the aforementioned parameter
choices, we conclude that the distributed controller (A.6) (hence (2.4)) synchronizes the
multi-agent system (2.3). This proves the first statement.
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Next, we prove the second statement of Proposition 2.3.2. We proceed by writing
the state-space equation for agent 1 using (2.3a) and (A.6b) as follows:


























 where Fo,U and Fo,S are un-



















F12 · · · F1ma G11Pd1 · · · G1mPdm G11Kd1 · · · G1mKdm
)
.

























Since x′(k), w(k), x̂′(k) converge to zero exponentially as k → ∞, it holds that
limk→∞
∥∥∥χ(1)S (k)
∥∥∥ = 0. Now, we consider the unstable dynamics of (A.12), which can be
represented by the following state-space equation:
χ
(1)















































be the limit point of (A.14).
To complete the proof, let us consider the following state-space equation:







for any vector χo,S of a proper dimension. Since Fo,U has the unit spectral radius by the
assumption of the second statement, due to the exponential convergence rate of (A.14),
we can see that limk→∞
∥∥χ(1)(k)− χo(k)
∥∥ = 0 holds.
Using the fact that limk→∞
∥∥χ(i)(k)− χ(1)(k)
∥∥ = 0 holds for all i in VI \ {1},
we conclude that limk→∞
∥∥χ(i)(k)− χo(k)
∥∥ = 0 holds for all i in VI . This proves the
Proposition.
A.4 Proofs of Lemmas 2.4.3 and 2.4.4
Proof of Lemma 2.4.3: Since the matrix L is a WLM of the graph G and the positive
real number α′ satisfies α′ ≤
(
max1≤i≤|V| lii
)−1, for every α in (0, α′), the matrix W is
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stochastic. Hence, it remains to show that for almost every α in (0, α′), W ⊗ A satisfies
the UEPP.
Let {υ1, · · · , υs} and {λ1, · · · , λt} be the sets of distinct eigenvalues of A and L,
respectively. Under the choice W = I|V| − αL, we can observe that if W ⊗ A does not
satisfy the UEPP, then its nonzero eigenvalue can be expressed as a product
(1− αλ)υ = (1− αλ′)υ′
for distinct λ, λ′ in {λ1, · · · , λt} and for distinct υ, υ′ in {υ1, · · · , υs}. Since the sets of
distinct eigenvalues of A and L are both finite, we conclude that the set of the values of α
for which the UEPP does not hold is finite. Hence, for almost every α in (0, α′), W ⊗ A
satisfies the UEPP. 
Proof of Lemma 2.4.4: By the UEPP of W⊗A, for each nonzero eigenvalue λ of W⊗A,
we can find the unique pair of eigenvalues λW and λA of W andA, respectively, for which
λ = λW ·λA holds. Since W has all simple eigenvalues and W⊗A satisfies the UEPP, we
can show that there is a unique eigenvector (unique up to a scale factor), say v, associated
with λW, and the geometric multiplicities of λ and λA are equal3. Hence, we can see that
an eigenvector q of W ⊗ A associated with λ can be written as q = v ⊗ p where p is an
eigenvector of A associated with λA. This proves the Lemma. 
A.5 Preliminary Results and Proof of Theorem 2.4.5
In this section, we provide a proof of Theorem 2.4.5. The proof hinges on some
results from structured linear system theory [110,111]. To this end, we briefly review the
3A proof of this argument is along similar lines as that of Lemma 3.8 in [20]
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structural controllability and observability of structured linear systems in Appendix A.5.1
and provide the detailed proof of Theorem 2.4.5 in Appendix A.5.3.
A.5.1 Structural Controllability and Observability
Consider a graph G = (V,E) with V = {1, · · · , |V|} and an associated structured
linear system whose state-space representation is given as follows:




where [A] ∈ R|V|×|V| is a structure matrix, and [bi] ∈ R|V| and [cj] ∈ R|V| are structure
vectors. Depending on respective sparse structures, entries of structure matrices and vec-
tors are either zero or indeterminate. In particular, we suppose that [A] is consistent4 with
the graph G, and all entries of [bi] and [cj] are zero except the i-th entry and j-th entry,
respectively. Under this setting, there are (|E|+ 2) indeterminate entries of [A], [bi], and
[cj], and if we allow each indeterminate entry to take a value in R, then a choice of these
entries can be represented by a vector in R|E|+2. In other words, the vectors in R|E|+2
specify all numerical realizations of (A.15).
The following Definition describes the structural controllability and observability
of structured linear systems (A.15).
Definition A.5.1. Let a graph G = (V,E) and an associated structured linear system
as in (A.15) be given. Let p be a vector in R|E|+2 that specifies a numerical realization
4A structure matrix [A] is consistent with a graph G if the (i, j)-th entry of [A] is indeterminate if
(j, i) ∈ E, and the entry is zero otherwise.
144
of (A.15). The pair ([A], [bi]) is said to be structurally controllable if for almost all p in
R|E|+2, the resulting numerical realizations of ([A], [bi]) are controllable. The structural






We can characterize the structural controllability and observability for the system
(A.15) in terms of its associated graph as in the following Proposition.
Proposition A.5.2. Let a strongly connected graph G = (V,E) and an associated struc-
tured linear system as in (A.15) be given. Then, for each i, j in V, the pair ([A], [bi]) is






Proof. The proof directly follows from relevant results from the structured linear system
literature (see, for instance, Theorem 1 in [110]). The detail is omitted for brevity.
A.5.2 A Key Lemma
The following Lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 2.4.5.
Lemma A.5.3. Given a strongly connected graph G = (V,E) with V = {1, · · · , |V|},
for any fixed vertex r in V, the following are true:







(ii) There exists a WLM L2 of G for which the pair (L2, er) is controllable.
(iii) There exists a WLM L3 of G for which all eigenvalues of L3 are simple.
where er is the r-th column of the |V|-dimensional identity matrix.
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Proof. We provide a two-part proof: In the first part, we prove (i) and (ii) using Proposi-
tion A.5.2; and then we provide a constructive proof of (iii).
Proof of (i) and (ii): Consider a structured linear system that is associated with







(A2, br) that are, respectively, observable and controllable. In particular, we may choose
A1 and A2 to be irreducible and (element-wise) nonnegative.
We compute L1 from A1 by applying a special similarity transform used in [112].
This procedure is described as follows: By the Perron-Frobenius Theorem, we can find
a right eigenvector ṽ (of A1) with all positive entries, which corresponds to the Perron-
Frobenius eigenvalue λ̃. Let M be a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the



















is also observable. Note that M−1A1M and A1 have the























By a similar argument, we can explicitly find a WLM L2 of G for which (L2, er) is
a controllable pair. This completes the first part of the proof.
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Proof of (iii): For a WLM L of G, we represent L as follows:
L =
(
l1 · · · l|V|
)T
(A.17)
where lTi is the i-th row of L. By re-scaling each row of L, we construct a WLM L3 of G
whose eigenvalues are all simple.
First of all, it is not difficult to show that for a positive real number α1, the following
matrix has all simple eigenvalues except at the origin.
(
α1l1 0 · · · 0
)T
∈ R|V|×|V|, (A.18)
where 0 is the |V|-dimensional zero vector. Suppose that for some positive real numbers
α1, · · · , αk, the following matrix has all simple eigenvalues except at the origin.
(
α1l1 · · · αklk 0 · · · 0
)T
∈ R|V|×|V| (A.19)
Recall that eigenvalues of a matrix depend continuously on entries of the matrix. Since
(A.19) has all simple eigenvalues except at the origin, for a sufficiently small positive real
number αk+1, the following matrix has all simple eigenvalues except at the origin.
(
α1l1 · · · αklk αk+1lk+1 0 · · · 0
)T
∈ R|V|×|V| (A.20)
By induction, we obtain
L3 =
(
α1l1 · · · α|V|l|V|
)T
(A.21)
that is a WLM of G and has all simple eigenvalues except at the origin for the selected
positive real numbers α1, · · · , α|V|. Since G is a strongly connected graph, the eigenvalue
of L3 at the origin is also simple [113]. This completes the second part of the proof.
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A.5.3 Proof of Theorem 2.4.5




































∣∣An eigenvalue of L is not simple
}
and a natural bijective mapping
π : L(G)→ R|E|−|V|<0 ,
where er is the r-th column of the |V|-dimensional identity matrix, and R|E|−|V|<0 is the
set of the (|E| − |V|)-dimensional vectors whose entries are all negative. To prove The-
orem 2.4.5, it is sufficient to show that the sets π (Lc1(G)), π (Lc2(G)), π (Lc3(G)) have the
Lebesgue measure zero in R|E|−|V|<0 .
In [110], the observability is shown to be a generic property of structured linear
systems. In words, unless every numerical realization of a given structured linear system
is not observable, almost every numerical realization is observable. By an application





Lebesgue measure zero in R|E|−|V|<0 . By a similar argument for the controllability of struc-





Lebesgue measure zero in R|E|−|V|<0 .
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Since G is a strongly connected graph, by Lemma A.5.3, we can show that for any r













r∈V Lc2,r(G), we conclude that π (Lc1(G)) and π (Lc2(G)) have the Lebesgue
measure zero in R|E|−|V|<0 .
Next, to prove that π (Lc3(G)) has the Lebesgue measure zero, we adopt the follow-
ing argument from algebra (see, for instance, Chapter 14.6 of [114]). For a matrix L in
Rm×m, all solutions to a polynomial equation
∆(λ)
def
= det(L− λI) = amλm + · · ·+ a1λ+ a0 = 0 (A.22)







is nonzero, where λi and λj are solutions to (A.22). This particular discriminant can be






of ∆(λ) and d
dλ
∆(λ) as follows:








The resultant R(f, g) of two polynomials f and g is a polynomial function of co-
efficients of f and g. Hence, by (A.23), we can see that the discriminant D(∆) can be
written as a polynomial function of coefficients of ∆(λ) and d
dλ
∆(λ). Since coefficients
of ∆(λ) and d
dλ
∆(λ) are polynomial functions of entries of L, the discriminant D(∆) is
a polynomial function of entries of L.
Also, notice that for a polynomial function D̃ defined on Rm̃, solutions
{
q ∈ Rm̃
∣∣ D̃ (q) = 0
}
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to the polynomial equation D̃ (q) = 0 form either the entire space Rm̃ or a proper alge-
braic variety in Rm̃, which has the Lebesgue measure zero [115].
For a strongly connected graph G, we have seen from Lemma A.5.3 that there exists
L3 ∈ L(G) whose eigenvalues are all simple. Therefore, Lc3(G) is a proper subset of
L(G), and by the aforementioned principles, π (Lc3(G)) has the Lebesgue measure zero in
R|E|−|V|<0 . 
150
Appendix B: Auxiliary Results for Chapter 3
B.1 On Product Metric Space
Given a metric space (X, d), we define a metric d on the product space Xk as fol-
lows: For x1:k = (x1, · · · , xk) and y1:k = (y1, · · · , yk) in Xk,
d(x1:k, y1:k) =
[






is a (product) metric space.




, the following are true:
(F1) For each i in {1, · · · , k}, let Ki be a compact subset of X. Then K1× · · · ×Kk is a
compact subset of Xk.









































for all j in {1, · · · , k}.
151
























B.2 On Randomized Policies
In our problem formulation described in Section 3.1, the randomized transmission
policy T k : N×X×X→ {0, 1} dictates the random variable Rk as in (3.1). Then given
respective realizations τk, xτk , and xk of the last transmission time τk, state xτk of the





0 with probability P
(
T k (τk,xτk ,xk) = 0
∣∣∣ τk = τk,xτk = xτk ,xk = xk
)
1 with probability P
(
T k (τk,xτk ,xk) = 1
∣∣∣ τk = τk,xτk = xτk ,xk = xk
)
In Section 3.2, the randomized policy Pj : X→ {0, 1} dictates the random variable
Rj as in (3.13). Then given a realization xj of the state xj of the underlying process at





0 with probability P
(
Pj (xj) = 0
∣∣∣xj = xj
)
1 with probability P
(
Pj (xj) = 1
∣∣∣xj = xj
)
Throughout the work, we restrict our attention to the policies in which
P
(
Pj (xj) = 0
∣∣∣xj = xj
)
is a measurable function of xj on the measurable space (X,B). As a case in point,
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0 if xj ∈ Dj
1 otherwise
where Dj ∈ B. It can be verified that
P
(







0 if xj ∈ Dj
1 otherwise
is a measurable function of xj .
B.3 Preliminary Concepts and Results
We first review some of key definitions and results from probability theory [93,116].
Let (X, d) be the metric space defined in Section 3.1, and let T and B be a topology and
a Borel σ-algebra derived from the metric, respectively. Recall that (X, d) is assumed to
be complete, separable, and proper (see Assumption 3.1.4).
Definition B.3.1. Let µ be a probability measure on (X,B). The probability measure is
said to be tight if for each ε > 0, there exists a compact subset K of (X, T ) for which
µ (K) > 1− ε holds.
The following is adopted from Theorem 7.1.4 in [93].
Lemma B.3.2. Any probability measure µ on (X,B) is tight.
Definition B.3.3. A probability measure µ defined on (X,B) is said to be closed regular








From Theorem 7.1.3 in [93], we can state the following Lemma.
Lemma B.3.4. Any probability measure µ on (X,B) is closed regular.
Remark B.3.5. For a probability measure µ,
µ (A) = 1− µ (X \ A) (B.3)
where A in B. If µ is closed regular then for every δ > 0, there exists a closed set F for
which F ⊂ X \ A and µ (X \ A) < µ (F) + δ. Let us define an open set O = X \ F. We
can see that O satisfies O ⊃ A and µ (O) < µ (A) + δ. Hence we conclude that
µ (A) = inf
{
µ (O)
∣∣O ∈ B open,O ⊃ A
}
(B.4)




i∈N and µ be a se-
quence of probability measures and a probability measure defined on (X,B), respec-
tively, and Cb (X) be the set of all bounded, continuous, real-valued functions on X. The












i∈N be a sequence of probability measures defined on (X,B).
The probability measures are said to be uniformly tight if for each ε > 0, there exists a
compact subset K of (X, T ) for which µ(i) (K) > 1− ε holds for all i in N.
A subset A of X is said to be a µ-continuity set if its boundary set has the zero
measure with respect to µ, i.e., µ (bd (A)) = 0. The following is the portmanteau theorem
(See Theorem 11.1.1 in [93]).
154




i∈N of probability measures and a probability mea-
sure µ on (X,B), the following are equivalent:
1. µ(i) w−→ µ
2. lim supi→∞ µ
(i) (F) ≤ µ (F) for any closed subset F of X
3. lim infi→∞ µ(i) (O) ≥ µ (O) for any open subset O of X
4. limi→∞ µ(i) (A) = µ (A) for all µ-continuity subset A of X.
Based on Remark 3.2.11, we can state the following Lemma.
Lemma B.3.9. Given estimates x̂k:N , let Pk:N be non-degenerate policies satisfying




∣∣∣ d2 (x, x̂j) ≤ c′j
}
(B.5)




∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
)
= 1 (B.6)
for all j in {k, · · · , N}.
The proof follows from the fact that for each j in {k, · · · , N}, Kj contains the set
Dj defined in (3.27a) and Remark 3.2.11-1.
Remark B.3.10. Given policies Pk:N , for each j in {k, · · · , N}, let us define
µj|j (A) = P
(
xj ∈ A
∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
)
(B.7a)
µj|j−1 (A) = P
(
xj ∈ A
∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
)
(B.7b)
1Due to the properness assumption on the metric space (X, d) , every closed ball is a compact set.
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∣∣xj = x,Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
)
is the probability specified by
















where pj is the transition probability of the process {xj}Nj=k.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3.2.14
To start with, we note that for each j in {k, · · · , N}, Gj can be written as follows:




d2 (xj, x̂j) + Gj+1 (xj, x̂j+1:N) , c′j
} ∣∣∣xj−1 = xj−1
]
with GN+1 = 0.
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We prove the Proposition by induction. First, notice that since GN+1 = 0, it is
a continuous function. Suppose that Gj+1 is a continuous function. To show that Gj is
continuous, we rewrite Gj as follows:






where g(x, x̂j:N) = min
{
d2 (x, x̂j) + Gj+1 (x, x̂j+1:N) , c′j
}
. Note that g is a continuous
function.
To verify the continuity of Gj , let {x(i)j−1}i∈N and {x̂(i)j:N}i∈N be sequences that con-
verge to xj−1 and x̂j:N , respectively. For each set A in B, let us define
µ
(i)



















weakly converges to µj . Since
(X, d) is a complete, separable metric space (see Assumption 3.1.4), by the Skorokhod








a random variable yj all defined on a common probability space (Ω,F, ν) in which the
following three facts are true:
(F1) µ(i)j is the probability measure of y
(i)
j , i.e., ν
({
ω ∈ Ω





for each A in B.





= µj (A) for








converges to yj almost surely.
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g (yj(ω), x̂j:N) dν (B.11)

















≤ c′j for all i











= g (yj(ω), x̂j:N)
for almost every ω in Ω. Using the bounded convergence theorem (see Theorem 16.5





























g (yj(ω), x̂j:N) dν
∣∣∣∣ = 0
Finally, by induction, we conclude that the functions {Gj}Nj=k are all continuous. 
B.5 Proofs of Proposition 3.2.16 and Lemma 3.2.18













is non-empty, where J∗j0+1 is defined in (3.25).

















to the preceding sub-problems – Sub-problem k+1 to Sub-problemN .
Let us fix xj0 in X. Under the choice of x̂j0 = xj0 and x̂l = E<j0>l (xj0) for each l in













) ∣∣∣xj0 = 0
]
where x̂′l = E<j0>l (0) for each l in {j0 + 1, · · · , N}. Hence, at xj0 = x̂j0 , it holds that






















) ∣∣∣xj0 = 0
]
= c′j0
This proves the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.16: By contradiction, suppose that x̂∗k:N is a global minimizer
of (3.31) in which the policies P∗k:N satisfying P∗k:N ∈ P (x̂∗k:N) are degenerate. Let




∣∣∣R∗k = 0, · · · ,R∗j0−1 = 0
)
= 0 (B.13)
holds. Since j0 is the smallest such integer, by Remark B.3.10, the probability measure
µj0|j0−1 of xj0 is well-defined.























is non-empty. Note that according to Corollary 3.2.15, the set Dj0 is open; hence, from




∣∣∣R∗k = 0, · · · ,R∗j0−1 = 0
)
> 0 (B.15)

































P∗j for j ∈ {k, · · · , j0 − 1}





x̂∗j for j ∈ {k, · · · , j0 − 1}
x̂oj for j ∈ {j0, · · · , N}






























∣∣∣R′k = 0, · · · ,R′j0−1 = 0
)
> 0 (B.18)





xj0 ,P∗j0:N , x̂
∗
j0:N
) ∣∣∣R∗k = 0, · · · ,R∗j0−1 = 0
]
= c′j0
While, by the way new policies and estimates are defined for j in {j0, · · · , N}, using





xj0 ,P ′j0:N , x̂
′
j0:N









) ∣∣∣R′k = 0, · · · ,R′j0−1 = 0
]
< c′j0





xj0 ,P ′j0:N , x̂
′
j0:N






xj0 ,P∗j0:N , x̂
∗
j0:N
) ∣∣∣R∗k = 0, · · · ,R∗j0−1 = 0
]
Using the facts that P ′j = P∗j and x̂′j = x̂∗j for j in {k, · · · , j0 − 1}, and j0 is the smallest
integer for which (B.13) holds, from (3.14), we can infer that
G (x̂′k:N) ≤ Exk [Jk (xk,P ′k:N , x̂′k:N)] < Exk [Jk (xk,P∗k:N , x̂∗k:N)] = G (x̂∗k:N)
which violates the optimality of the global minimizer. Therefore, the global minimizer
has to be non-degenerate. 






































is bounded for all
j in {k, · · · , j0}.

































































∣∣∣xj′ ∈ K(il)j′ ,R
(il)




























xj′ ∈ K(il)j′ ,R
(il)









































This contradicts the fact that (B.19) holds for all j in {k, · · · , j0}.






∣∣∣ d (0, x̂j) ≤ r for all j in {k, · · · , N}
}
(B.25)
To prove the Lemma, it is sufficient to show that there exists r > 0 for which with








⊂ XN−k+1 that satisfies the following hypotheses:
(H1) For each element x̂(i)k:N of the sequence, it holds that x̂
(i)
k:N /∈ Ki.







We constructively show that the hypothesis (H2) is violated for sufficiently large i







































































is bounded for all j in {k, · · · , j0 − 1}.




































) ∣∣∣xj0 = xj0
]

















) ∣∣∣xj0 = xj0
]
< c′j0 − ε
}
(B.29)
is non-empty and open.













































P (i)j for j ∈ {k, · · · , j0 − 1}









j for j ∈ {k, · · · , j0 − 1}
x̂oj for j ∈ {j0, · · · , N}
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This contradicts the hypothesis (H2), and completes the proof of the Lemma. In what fol-








is bounded, by Lemma B.3.9, and by the fact that
P ′(i)j = P
(i)

















holds for all i in N. Hence, due to Assumption 3.1.5 and the compactness of Kj0−1, for













j0−1|j0−1 ≥ δj0 · µ
′(i)
j0−1|j0−1 (Kj0−1) = δj0 (B.30)




j0−1|j0−1 (A) = P
(
xj0−1 ∈ A












is bounded for all j in {k, · · · , j0 − 1}, for suf-












are defined, using (3.14), (B.29) and (B.30), we










































































) ∣∣∣R′(i)k = 0, · · · ,R
′(i)









) ∣∣∣R′(i)k = 0, · · · ,R
′(i)








































≤ c′j0 − ε · δj0 (B.31)

















if R′(i)j0 = 0 (or equivalently xj0 ∈ Dj0), and B is a subset of Dj0; whereas (2) and (3)
follow from (B.29) and (B.30), respectively. By a similar argument as in the proof of
Proposition 3.2.16, from (B.27) and (B.31), we can observe that for sufficiently large i,







































be a sequence of estimates that converges to x̂k:N . The











































































where J∗j+1 is defined in (3.25).






j . By definition, there exists an infinite index
set {il}l∈N for which xj ∈ D
(il)














) ∣∣∣xj = xj
]
≤ c′j (B.33)








x̂k:N , we can derive







which shows that xj ∈ Dj . This proves (B.32a).










As the rest of the proof is similar to the above arguments, we omit the detail for brevity.





, let us define
µ
(i)
j|j−1 (A) = P
(
xj ∈ A







j|j (A) = P
(
xj ∈ A

















j|j (Kj) = 1 (B.37)








uniformly tight in the sense of Definition B.3.7 for all j in {k, · · · , N}. According to
























takes a value in a compact set [ε, 1], for an infinite














where qj takes a value in [ε, 1]. For these reasons, without loss of generality, we prove the
Lemma under the following assumptions: For each j in {k, · · · , N},













= qj whose value belongs to [ε, 1].
We proceed by showing that there exist policies Pk:N for which
(A1) For every A in B, it holds that
µj|j (A) = P
(
xj ∈ A







∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
)
(B.38b)
where Rj is dictated by Pj for each j in {k, · · · , N}.































































































for each i in N and j in {k, · · · , N}, where J∗j+1 is defined in (3.25). Note that according
to Corollary 3.2.15, the sets (B.39a) and (B.40a) are closed, and the sets (B.39b) and
(B.40b) are open.
We first make the following two claims to show that (A1) is true.






pj (x,A) dµj−1|j−1 (B.41)
where pj is the transition probability of the process {xj}Nj=k. Then, µj|j−1 is a probability





j|j−1 (A) = µj|j−1 (A)
for all A in B.






pj (x,A) dµ(i)j−1|j−1 (B.42)
holds for each A in B, and by definition, for each x in X, A 7→ pj(x,A) is a prob-
ability measure on (X,B). In conjunction with Assumption 3.1.5-2, we can see that












pj (x,A) dµj−1|j−1 = µj|j−1 (A) (B.43)
Lastly, the claim that µj|j−1 is a probability measure on (X,B) follows from the
fact that A 7→ pj(x,A) is a probability measure on (X,B). 
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holds for all A in B, where µj|j−1 is defined in (B.41).
Based on Lemma B.3.8 and Remark B.3.10-1, for any open set O, we can see that
the following relations hold:































holds for any set A in B. To justify the argument, by contradiction, suppose that for a set





By the closed regularity theorem (see Theorem 7.1.3 in [93]) and Remark B.3.5, we can
choose an open set O containing A for which






holds. This contradicts (B.45).
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Notice that (B.46) implies that µj|j is absolutely continuous with respect to µj|j−1.







holds for all A in B. In addition, it can be verified that fj(x) ≤ 1 for almost every x in
X; otherwise (B.46) would be violated. 











∣∣∣xj = x,Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
)
= fj(x)











Since it holds that µk|k−1 (A) = P (xk ∈ A), from (B.51), we can see that
qk = P (Rk = 0)
Hence, in conjunction with Remark B.3.10-1, we can see that





Then, using (B.41) and Remark B.3.10-2, we can observe that






By repeating this verification for each j in {k, · · · , N}, we conclude that
µj|j (A) = P
(
xj ∈ A






∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
)
hold for all j in {k, · · · , N}. 
Henceforth, we make two additional claims under the policies Pk:N determined as
in (B.50) to show that (A2) is valid.




∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
)
= 0
To prove the claim, let O be an open set contained in Dcj . By Remark 3.2.11-1 and
Remark B.3.10-1, we can derive the following:
µ
(i)






















By applying Lemma B.3.8, we obtain
























































∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
) (B.54)
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∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
) = 0 (B.55)
Since Dcj is an open set, by selecting O = D
c
j , we conclude that





holds for every Borel measurable subset A of Dcj . 
Claim 4: Suppose that P
(
Rj = 1
∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
)
> 0. Then, for any Borel




∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 1
)
= 0




xj ∈ F ∩ D(i)j







xj ∈ F ∩ D(i)j














Using (B.57) and Theorem B.3.8, we can derive the following:
































































∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
) (B.58)





























∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
) (B.59)








































Using the fact that P
(
Rj = 1
∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
)




∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 1
)
= 0 (B.61)
From the closed regularity theorem (see Theorem 7.1.3 in [93]), for any Borel measurable














) ∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
]
and J∗j given in (3.14) and (3.25), respectively.
For j = N , using Claim 3 and Claim 4, we can derive the following:
ExN
[
d2 (xN , x̂
′
N)






























∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,RN−1 = 0
)
> 0. From (3.14), (3.25), and
(B.63), we can derive that
ExN
[
JN (xN ,PN , x̂′N)




J∗N (xN , x̂
′
N)



















) ∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj = 0
]
(B.65)





















































































∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
)
> 0. From (3.14), (3.25), and (B.66),















) ∣∣∣Rk = 0, · · · ,Rj−1 = 0
]
(B.67)
By induction, we conclude that (B.67) holds for all j in {k, · · · , N}. By Defini-












it holds that Pk:N ∈P (x̂′k:N). 
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B.7 Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
Notice that under (3.41), the cost-to-go of (3.2) from time k can be written as fol-
lows:






d2 (xj , x̂j) + cj ·Rj






d2 (xj , x̂j)
+ (cK + JK+1 (xK,T K+1:N , EK+1:N )) ·RK






d2 (xj , x̂j)













j ∈ {k, · · · , N}
∣∣∣Rj = 1
}
if Rj = 1 for some j ∈ {k, · · · , N}
N otherwise
First we consider the case where for each k in {1, · · · , N}, T ∗<k−1>k:N and E∗<k−1>k:N
are a jointly optimal solution of Sub-problem k. We will show that for any transmission
polices T 1:N and estimation rules E1:N ,
Jk (xk−1,T ∗k:N , E∗k:N) ≤ Jk (xk−1,T k:N , Ek:N) (B.69)
holds for all xk−1 in X and all k in {1, · · · , N}.
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For k = N , note that (B.68) can be written as
JN (xN−1,T N , EN)
= E
[
d2 (xN , x̂N) + cN ·RN
∣∣∣xN−1 = xN−1,T <N−1>N , E<N−1>N
]
By joint optimality of the solution T ∗<N−1>N and E∗<N−1>N , we can see that
JN (xN−1,T ∗N , E∗N) ≤ JN (xN−1,T N , EN)




xj,T ∗j+1:N , E∗j+1:N
)
≤ Jj+1 (xj,T j+1:N , Ej+1:N) (B.70)
holds for all xj in X and all j in {k, · · · , N −1}. Let {c′∗j }Nj=k be the stopping costs deter-











and let {c′j}Nj=k be constants determined by
c′j = cj + inf
xj∈X
Jj+1 (xj,T j+1:N , Ej+1:N) (B.71)






c′∗j = cj + Jj+1
(
xj,T ∗k+1:N , E∗k+1:N
)
which does not depend on xj . Then, from (B.68), we can derive the following relations
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for each xk−1 in X:





































≤ Jk (xk−1,T k:N , Ek:N) (B.72)
where (1) follows from the fact that T ∗<k−1>k:N and E∗<k−1>k:N are a jointly optimal solution
of Sub-problem k, (2) follows from Remark 3.1.11 and the fact that c′∗j ≤ c′j holds for all
j in {k, · · · , N}, and (3) follows from (B.68) and (B.71).
By induction, we can see that (B.69) holds for all xk−1 in X and all k in {1, · · · , N}.
Hence, we conclude that the solution T ∗1:N and E∗1:N determined by (3.41) is jointly opti-
mal for (3.2).
To prove the statement for person-by-person optimality, we note that for every k in








is a global minimizer
of (3.4) for Sub-problem k. By a similar argument as for the joint optimality case, we
can observe that with T ∗k:N fixed, E∗k:N determined by (3.41) minimizes (B.68), and vice
versa for all xk−1 in X and all k in {1, · · · , N}. This proves that T ∗1:N and E∗1:N are
person-by-person optimal for (3.2). 
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Appendix C: Auxiliary Results for Chapter 4
C.1 Proof of Proposition 4.2.4
We proceed by showing that for any C1 function SRD : Rn × X → R+ satisfying
(P1), the condition (P2) does not hold. Then, from Theorem 4.2.3, we conclude that the
replicator dynamics (4.3) are not passive.




xixj (pi − pj) (C.1)








xixj(pi − pj)2 + S(x)
where S is a C1 function. By taking a partial derivative of SRD with respect to x, we
obtain






















j=1 x1xj(p1 − pj)
...
∑n




Let us choose xj = 0 for all j ≥ 3. Then, we obtain




2x2(p1 − p2)2 + ∂S∂x1 (x)
1





















Note that for fixed x1, x2 (except for the points at which∇TxSRD(p, x)V (p, x) = 0 holds
for all p in Rn), there exists p ∈ Rn for which∇TxSRD(p, x)V (p, x) > 0 holds. Therefore,
the function SRD does not satisfy (P2). Since we made an arbitrary choice of SRD, we
conclude that no C1 function satisfies (P1) and (P2) for the replicator dynamics. 
C.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2.5
We first note that the condition (A) implies so-called the Strict Positive Correla-
tion (SPC) [102] given by
V (p, x) 6= 0 implies pTV (p, x) > 0 (SPC)
Let γ : Rn → R be a C1 function for which (I) holds. It can be verified that γ
satisfies
∇pγ(p̂) = V (p, x) (C.2a)







Let us select a candidate storage function as SEPT (p, x) = γ(p̂) where p̂ = p − 1 · pTx.
Due to (C.2a), the function SEPT satisfies (P1). In conjunction with the fact that %(p̂) = 0
implies V (p, x) = 0, due to (SPC) and (C.2b), we can see that (P2) holds for η = 0
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and the equality in (P2) holds only if V (p, x) = 0. According to the statement (S2) in
Theorem 4.2.3, to complete the proof, it remains to show that γ is non-negative.
We argue that the following inequality holds for every p̂ in Rn:
γ(p̂) ≥ γ(0) (C.3)
Then, without loss of generality by setting γ(0) = 0, we conclude that SEPT (p, x) = γ(p̂)
is non-negative. In what follows, we show that (C.3) is valid.
We first claim that (C.3) holds for all (p, x) in S, where S is the set of equilibrium
points of (4.10). Note that for each x in X, due to (SPC), it holds that V (0, x) = 0, i.e.,
0 ∈ Sx. By the fact that ∇pγ(p̂) = V (p, x), for fixed x, the following equality holds for
all p in Rn:
γ (p̂) = γ (0) +
∫ 1
0
ṗT (s)V (p(s), x) ds (C.4)
where p : [0, 1] → R is a parameterization of a piece-wise smooth path from 0 to p.
According the path-connectedness assumption (see Section 4.1.2.2), for each p in Sx,
there is a path from 0 to p in which the entire path is contained in Sx, i.e., V (p(s), x) = 0
holds for all s in [0, 1]; hence
γ (p̂)− γ (0) =
∫ 1
0
ṗT (s)V (p(s), x) ds = 0 (C.5)
holds for every p in Sx. Since (C.5) holds for every (p, x) in S, this proves the claim.
To see that (C.3) also holds for (p, x) in (Rn × X)\S, by contradiction, let us assume
that there is (p′, x′) /∈ S for which SEPT (p′, x′) = γ(p̂′) < γ(0). Let x(·) be a population
state trajectory induced by (4.10) for the initial condition x(0) = x′ and constant payoff
p(t) = p′ for all t in R+. By (SPC) and (C.2b), the value of SEPT (p′, x(t)) is strictly
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decreasing unless V (p′, x(t)) = 0. By the hypothesis that SEPT (p′, x′) < γ(0) and by
(C.5), for every (p, x) in S, it holds that
SEPT (p
′, x′) < SEPT (p, x)
and the trajectory (p′, x(·)) never converges to S. On the other hand, by LaSalle’s Theo-
rem [101], since p(t) is constant and the population state x(t) is contained in a compact
set, x(t) converges to an invariant subset of
{
x ∈ X
∣∣∇TxSEPT (p′, x)V (p′, x) = 0
}
. By
(SPC) and (C.2b), the invariant set is contained in S. This contradicts the fact that the
trajectory (p′, x(·)) does not converge to S; hence γ(p̂) ≥ γ(0) holds for all (p, x) in
(Rn × X) \ S. 
C.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2.7








zT∇xv(x) = zTp if and only if C(p) = x (C.6b)
for all p in Rn, x in X, and z in TX. Using (C.6), we can show that
∇pSPBR(p, x) = C(p)− x = V (p, x) (C.7)
and
∇TxSPBR(p, x)V (p, x) = − (p−∇xv(x))T V (p, x)
= − (∇yv(y)−∇xv(x))T (y − x) (C.8)
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where y = C(p). By the fact that v is strictly convex, it holds that∇TxSPBR(p, x)V (p, x) ≤ 0
where the equality holds only if V (p, x) = 0. According to Theorem 4.2.3, we conclude
that the PBR dynamics are strictly passive.
Furthermore, if the perturbation v is strongly convex, i.e.,
(∇yv(y)−∇xv(x))T (y − x) ≥ η′ · ‖y − x‖2
holds for all x, y in X, then from (C.8), we can derive that
∇TxSPBR(p, x)V (p, x) ≤ −η′ · ‖V (p, x)‖2 (C.9)
Hence, by Theorem 4.2.3, we conclude that the PBR dynamics are strictly output passive
and satisfies the passivity inequality (4.7) for η = η′. 
C.4 Proof of Proposition 4.2.8
The first part of the statement directly follows from the condition (P1) and the fact
that at a global minimizer (p∗, x∗) of SED, it holds that∇pSED(p∗, x∗) = 0.
Now suppose that the dynamics satisfy (NS). To prove the second statement, it is
sufficient to show that at each equilibrium point (p, x) of (4.2), it holds that SED(p, x) =
0. To this end, let us consider an anti-coordination game whose payoff function is given
by Fxo(x) = −(x − xo) for a fixed xo ∈ X. Notice that xo is a unique Nash equilibrium
of the game. In what follows, we show that SED(po, xo) = 0 holds for any choice of xo
from X and po from Sxo .
Let (p∗, x∗) be a global minimizer of SED, i.e., SED (p∗, x∗) = 0. By the first part








(p∗)T V (s · p∗, x∗) ds = 0
By the continuity of SED, for each ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 for which it holds that
SED (δ · Fxo(x∗), x∗) < ε.
According to the passivity conditions (P1) and (P2) for η = 0, the following relation
holds for every positive constant δ:
d
dt
SED(δ · Fxo(x(t)), x(t))
≤ δ · V T (δ · Fxo(x(t)), x(t))DFx0(x(t))ẋ(t)
= −δ · ‖V (δ · Fxo(x(t)), x(t))‖2 (C.10)
where the trajectory x(·) starts from x∗. By an application of LaSalle’s theorem [101]
and by (NS), we can verify that (δ · Fxo(x(t)), x(t)) converges to (0, xo) as t → ∞. In
addition, due to (C.10), we have that
SED (0, xo) ≤ SED (δ · Fx0(x∗), x∗) < ε
Since this holds for every ε > 0, we conclude that SED(0, xo) = 0. By the fact that
V (s · po, xo) = 0 for all s in R+ if po belongs to Sxo , we can see that
SED(po, xo) = SED(0, xo) +
∫ 1
0
pTo V (s · po, xo) ds = 0 (C.11)
holds for every po in Sxo .
Since the choice of xo from X in constructing the game was arbitrary, we conclude
that (C.11) holds for every (po, xo) in S. This proves the Proposition. 
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C.5 Proof of Proposition 4.2.10
We first construct a game F based on the Hypnodisk game [104], which is described



















































and b is a bump function that satisfies
1. b(a) = 1 if a ≤ R2I
2. b(a) = 0 if a ≥ R2O
3. b(a) is decreasing if R2I < a < R
2
O
with 0 < RI < RO < 1√6 . Consider a payoff function F
′ given by




Hi(x1, x2, x3 + · · ·+ xn) if i ∈ {1, 2}
H3(x1, x2, x3 + · · ·+ xn) otherwise
(C.12)
Note that the set of Nash equilibria for F ′ is given by
{
x ∈ X






Since θ is a smooth function, F ′ is continuously differentiable, and its differential map
DF ′ is bounded, i.e., for some δ > 0, it holds that zTDF ′(x)z < δ · zT z for all x in X





Using the payoff function Fν , we prove the statement of the Proposition. By con-
tradiction, suppose that there is a payoff monotonic dynamic, i.e., the dynamic satisfies
both (NS) and (PC), that is strictly output passive. By definition, the dynamic satisfies
the passivity inequality (4.7) for η > 0. Consider a population game described by Fν in




SED(Fν(x(t)), x(t)) ≤ −(η − ν) · ‖V (Fν(x(t)), x(t))‖
By an application of LaSalle’s theorem [101] and by (NS), we can verify that x(t) con-
verges to the set of Nash equilibria given as in (C.13).























by the condition (PC), it holds that

























Hence, the population state x(t) never converges to the set of Nash equilibria. This is a
contradiction. Therefore, the dynamic cannot be strictly output passive. 
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C.6 Proof of Proposition 4.2.12
The sufficiency directly follows from the choice ofEED = SED and the inequalities
in (4.7) and (4.16), where SED is a storage function of the passive evolutionary dynamic.
To prove the necessity, we consider a set of population games represented by cumulative
payoff functions ṗ = Ax, where A is a symmetric matrix in Rn×n. It can be verified that









Let us select a candidate Lyapunov function E = SG + EED for a C1 function
EED : Rn × X→ R+. The time derivative of E leads to the following:
d
dt
E(p, x) = ∇TxSG(x)ẋ+∇TpEED(p, x)ṗ+∇TxEED(p, x)ẋ
= −V T (p, x)Ax+∇TpEED(p, x)Ax+∇TxEED(p, x)V (p, x)
= (∇pEED(p, x)− V (p, x))T Ax+∇TxEED(p, x)V (p, x) ≤ 0 (C.15)
Since x belongs to X and A could be any symmetric matrix in Rn×n, the inequal-
ity in (C.15) holds for every choice of A if and only if ∇pEED(p, x) = V (p, x) and
∇TxEED(p, x)V (p, x) ≤ 0 hold. By Theorem 4.2.3, we conclude that the dynamic is
passive with a storage function SED = EED. 
C.7 Proof of Corollary 4.2.13
The sufficiency directly follows from the definition of passivity. To prove the ne-
cessity, by contradiction, suppose that the dynamic is not passive. Then, by Proposi-
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tion 4.2.12, for any choice of SED, we can construct a game identified by a cumulative
payoff function given as in (4.14) for which
SG (x(t)) + SED (p(t), x(t)) > SG (x(t0)) + SED (p(t0), x(t0)) (C.16)
holds, where SG is given in (4.15). According to (4.16), this yields that
SED(p(t), x(t)) > SED(p(t0), x(t0)) +
∫ t
t0
F T (x(τ))ẋ(τ) dτ (C.17)
which contradicts the fact that the dynamic satisfies the passivity inequality (4.7) for every
cumulative payoff function (4.14). 
C.8 Proof of Proposition 4.2.14
As the revision protocol depends only on the the gradient∇xu(p, x) = p−∇xv(x)
and the population state x, we represent the revision protocol and vector field of the
dynamic as %ji (∇xu(p, x), x) and V (∇xu(p, x), x), respectively. Since unperturbed dy-
namics are passive, by Theorem 4.2.3, we can find a storage function SED : Rn × X→ R+
for which the conditions (P1) and (P2) hold for η = 0. In what follows, we show that the
resulting perturbed dynamics are strictly passive with a storage function
S̃ED(p, x)
def
= SED (p−∇xv(x), x)
We first compute the gradient of S̃ED with respect to p and x as follows:
∇pS̃ED (p, x) = ∇p′SED (p′, x)
∣∣∣
p′=p−∇xv(x)


















Using (C.19), we can derive the following:
∇Tx S̃ED(p, x)V (p−∇xv(x), x)




≤ −V T (p−∇xv(x), x)∇2xv(x)V (p−∇xv(x), x) (C.20)
where (1) is due to passivity of the unperturbed dynamics. Since v satisfies zT∇2xv(x)z > 0
for all x in X and nonzero z in TX,
∇Tx S̃ED(p, x)V (p−∇xv(x), x) = 0
holds only if V (p−∇xv(x), x) = 0. Using Theorem 4.2.3, we can see that the perturbed
dynamics are strictly passive.
Now suppose that v is strongly convex satisfying
zT∇2xv(x)z ≥ η · zT z (C.21)
for all x in X and z in TX, where η′ is a positive constant. From (C.20), we can see that
∇Tx S̃ED(p, x)V (p−∇xv(x), x)
≤ −η · V T (p−∇xv(x), x)V (p−∇xv(x), x)
holds. Hence, from Theorem 4.2.3, we conclude that the perturbed dynamics are strongly
output passive. 
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C.9 Proof of Theorem 4.3.1





n × X, if
∇TxSED
(
p(l), x(l))V (p(l), x(l)
)








then, in both (CL1) and (CL2), we can see that ∇TxSPBR(p(l), x(l))V (p(l), x(l))
l→∞−→ 0.




































Since SED(p(t), x(t)) > ε2 holds for all t in Oε, by the contrapositive of (A2’), there exists
δ1 > 0 for which
∇TxSED(p(t), x(t))V (p(t), x(t)) + ν · V T (p(t), x(t))V (p(t), x(t)) ≤ −δ1
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holds1 for all t in Oε. Note that using (4.22), we can derive the following relations:





















Since SED is a non-negative function, we can infer that (C.22) is lower-bounded by
−SED(p(0), x(0))− α for all t ≥ 0, which yields that












∇TxSED(p(τ), x(τ))V (p(τ), x(τ)) + ν · V T (p(τ), x(τ))V (p(τ), x(τ))
]
dτ
≤ −δ1 · L (Oε) (C.23)
whereL (Oε) is the Lebesgue measure of Oε. Hence, we have thatL (Oε) ≤ SED(p(0),x(0))+αδ1 .
Since Oε is an open set, we can represent Oε as an union of disjoint open intervals,
i.e., Oε =
⋃
i∈N Ii where {Ii}i∈N is a set of disjoint open intervals. Notice that by our




for t ∈ Ii. Since Oε has finite Lebesgue measure, it holds that
limi→∞ L (Ii) = 0.
1Notice that under the configurations as in (CL1) or (CL2), it holds that
∇TxSED(p(t), x(t))V (p(t), x(t)) + ν · V T (p(t), x(t))V (p(t), x(t)) ≤ 0
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In what follows, we show that for each ε > 0, there exists Tε > 0 for which
SED(p(t), x(t)) < ε holds for all t ≥ Tε, and we conclude that limt→∞ SED(p(t), x(t)) = 0.




SED(p(t), x(t)) ≥ ε
for each j in J, where cl (Ij) is the closure of Ij . Let tj ∈ cl (Ij) be for which
SED(p(tj), x(tj)) = max
t∈cl(Ij)
SED(p(t), x(t))
holds. By letting Ij = (aj, bj), we can derive the following:











ṗT (τ)V (p(τ), x(τ)) dτ
(2)
< M · δ2 · L (Ij) (C.24)
The inequality (1) can be derived using Theorem 4.2.3. To see that (2) holds, recall that
from (C.22), SED(p(t), x(t)) ≤ SED(p(0), x(0)) + α holds for all t ≥ 0, and that ṗ is
bounded, i.e, there is a positive realM for which ‖ṗ(t)‖ < M holds for all t in R+. Hence,
according to the contrapositive of (A1), we can derive ṗT (τ)V (p(τ), x(τ)) < M · δ2 for
some δ2 > 0, which yields (2).
Since SED(p(aj), x(aj)) ≤ ε2 and limj→∞ L (Ij) = 0, from (C.24), we can see that
SED(p(tj), x(tj)) < ε for sufficiently large j in J. This contradicts the hypothesis that
SED(p(tj), x(tj)) ≥ ε holds for all j in J. Since this holds for every ε > 0, we can infer
194
that for each ε > 0, there exists Tε > 0 for which SED(p(t), x(t)) < ε holds for all t ≥ Tε.

C.10 Proof of Proposition 4.3.2







ẋT (τ)DF T1 (x(τ))ẋ(τ) dτ +
∫ t
0































ẋT (τ − d)ẋ(τ − d) dτ
≤ (ν1 + ν2)
∫ t
0





ẋT (τ)ẋ(τ) dτ (C.25)
To show (1), we use (4.25a) and the following fact:






ẋT (τ − d)DF T2 (x(τ − d))DF2(x(τ − d))ẋ(τ − d)





T (τ)ẋ(τ)dτ , we can see that
the payoff function (4.24) satisfies (4.22) with ν = ν1 + ν2.
If ν2 = 0 then we can see that DF2(x)z = 0 for all x in X and z in TX. Based on
the above analysis, by defining α = 0, we can conclude that (4.24) satisfies (4.22) with
ν = ν1. 
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C.11 Proof of Proposition 4.3.3
First of all, we note that with a choice of P as p̂(s) = s · p̂, according to (A) of the
EPT dynamics, we can see that S (p̂) =
∫ 1
0
p̂T%(s · p̂) ds ≥ 0. We proceed the proof by
choosing a storage function for the dynamics as SEPT (p, x) = S (p̂), and show that (A1)
and (A2) of Theorem 4.3.1 hold. To start with, we verify that the contrapositive of (A1)
is true. Notice that






≤ (√n+ 1) · ‖%(p̂)‖ (C.26)
where the last inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Suppose that there
exists ε > 0 for which SEPT (p, x) < ε holds. By the contrapositive of (C1), there exists
δ′ > 0 for which ‖%(p̂)‖ < δ′ holds. By (C.26), it holds that ‖V (p, x)‖ < (√n+1)·δ′ = δ;
hence the contrapositive of (A1) holds.
To verify that (A2) of Theorem 4.3.1 holds, notice that






We claim that if SEPT (p, x) ≥ ε holds for a positive real ε, then there exist δ1, δ2 > 0
for which 1T%(p̂) ≥ δ1 and p̂T%(p̂) ≥ δ2 hold. Hence we have that
∇TxSEPT (p, x)V (p, x) ≤ −δ1 · δ2 = −δ
This proves that the contrapositive of (A2) is true. We prove the claim by contradic-



















= 0 or both and SEPT (p(l), x(l)) ≥ ε





contradicts our hypothesis that SEPT (p(l), x(l)) ≥ ε holds for all l ∈ N. 
C.12 Proof of Proposition 4.3.5







Sj(pj − pi, xi) (C.27)
The partial derivative of (C.27) with respect to x satisfies2














To prove the Proposition, we show that (A1) and (A2) of Theorem 4.3.1 hold. We
first show that the contrapositive of (A1) of Theorem 4.3.1 is true. Suppose that for
some ε > 0, it holds that SPC(p, x) < ε. Then Sj(pj − pi, xi) < ε holds for all i, j in
{1, · · · , n}, and by (C1), there exists δ′ > 0 for which xi%j(pj − pi) < δ′ holds for all




xj%i(pi − pj) +
n∑
j=1
xi%j(pj − pi) (C.29)
we have that |Vi(p, x)| < 2n · δ′ which implies that ‖V (p, x)‖ < 2n3/2 · δ′ = δ. This
shows that the contrapositive of (A1) is true.
Next, we consider the contrapositive of (A2). Suppose that SPC(p, x) ≥ ε for some
2This fact directly follows from the analysis in the proof of Theorem 7.1 in [14]
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ε > 0. We note that according to (C.27), there exists δ1 > 0, e.g., δ1 = εn2 , for which
max
i,j∈{1,··· ,n}





%j(s) ds ≥ δ1 (C.30)










Then by the contrapositive of (C2), there exists δ2 > 0 for which it holds that
%j∗(pj∗ − pi∗) ≥ δ2 (C.32)
Since xi%j(pj − pi)
∫ pk−pj
pk−pi
%k(s) ds ≤ 0 holds, according to (C.28), we can derive
the following:




for any i∗, j∗, k∗ in {1, · · · , n}. In particular, we choose i∗, j∗ that satisfy (C.31) and
k∗ = j∗. Then, in conjunction with (C.30) and (C.32), we have that
∇TxSPC(p, x)V (p, x) ≤ xi∗%j∗(pj∗ − pi∗)
∫ 0
pj∗−pi∗
%j∗(s) ds ≤ −δ1 · δ2 = −δ
This verifies (A2) of Theorem 4.3.1. This completes the proof of the Proposition. 
C.13 Proof of Proposition 4.3.7
From Proposition 4.2.7, we have seen that









is a storage function of the PBR dynamics. We verify that the assumptions (A1) and (A2)
of Theorem 4.3.1 hold.
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The verification of (A1) directly follows from the facts that ‖V (p, x)‖ ≤ ‖C(p)‖+ ‖x‖









= pT (C(p)− x)− (v(C(p))− v(x))
(1)
≤ (p−∇xv(x))T (C(p)− x)
(2)
= −∇TxSPBR(p, x)V (p, x) (C.33)
To obtain (1), we use the fact that v is a convex function; and to show (2), we use (C.8) in
the proof of Proposition 4.2.7. Therefore, from (C.33), we conclude that (A2) is true. 
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